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ABSTRACT
Paradoxical Communication Reconsidered
February 1984
Mary L. Haake, B.A., University of California
M.S., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Harold L. Raush
This dissertation argues that the formal application of
the Epimenides paradox and Russell's set paradox to
communication has often been incorrect. It is further
argued that the vicious-circle dynamics generated by these
logical par adoxes-- they are true only if false and vice
versa—have been mistakenly conceptualized as powerful
determinants of social interaction. Two communication forms
described as paradoxical in the literature are shown not to
be formal paradoxes. These forms are: 1) contrad ictory
doub 1 e- 1 e ve 1 communication which includes Bateson's original
paradoxes of abstraction, the double bind, and the strange
loop; and 2) the request for involuntary beha v ior which
includes hypnotic injunctions, therapeutic paradox, and
requests for feeling shifts in ordinary relationships, e.g.,
"You should enjoy helping me." A third communication form,
the request for noncomp l iant beha v ior , is shown to be
formally paradoxical. This form derives from the
injunction, "Disobey me," and includes requests for
v i
independence, dominance and defiance. Utilizing the
Coordinated Management of Meaning model of human
communication (Pearce and Cronen, 1980), all three forms are
described as cu 1 tura 1- level metarules which specify
potential meaning patterns, but do not determine actual
social transactions.
An interview study was carried out to investigate how
involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior
requests are negotiated in ordinary close relationships.
Forty undergraduate women in two equal groups described
events surrounding either an involuntary or a noncompliant
behavior request which they expressed in a close
relationship. It was found that, contrary to the stereotype
in the literature that these requests frustrate positive
outcomes, satisfying responses following such requests
commonly occur. h qualitative analysis of the data suggests
that the significant context for understanding these
requests involves the relational issues of closeness and
control
.
v i i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
j_ v
Chapter
I. OVERVIEW 1
II. FORM AND FORMAL DETERMINISM IN
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF PARADOXICAL COMMUNICATION 7
The Formal Definition of Paradox used
by Communication Theorists 8
The Issue of Formal Determinism 15
Contradictory Double-level Communication ... 23
The paradoxes of abstraction 24
The strange loop 32
The double bind 37
The original paper 37
The double bind and paradox:
the original authors 41
The double bind and paradox:
the larger field 46
Critique 48
The Special Case of the
"Be Spontaneous" Paradox 52
The Request for Involuntary Behavior 53
The request for involuntary
behavior in hypnosis 57
The request for involuntary
behavior in therapy 60
The request for involuntary
behavior in ordinary relationships ... 63
The Request for Noncompliant Behavior 69
III. AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF
PARADOXICAL COMMUNICATION 74
The CMM Model of Human Communication 75
Hierarchical levels of meaning 75
Rules 80
Logical force 84
An Alternative Conceptual Model
of Paradoxical Communication 86
Formal paradox • • • • 89
Contradictory double-level communication . . 90
The request for involuntary behavior .... 95
The request for noncompliant behavior. . . .
v i i i
IV. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INVOLUNTARY BEHAVIOR
REQUESTS AND NONCOMPL I ANT BEHAVIOR REQUESTS.
. . 103
Purpose of Study 103
Design
...... 107Subjects ' ' 109
Materials and Procedures m
Elicitation 111
Descriptive measures 112
Duration and frequency of the request
and responses following the request.
. . 113
Content and speech act meanings 114
Episodic variables of valence,
coherence, and control 114
Life-script and relationship
levels of meaning 116
Research questions 118
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 121
Overview 121
Introduction to Data 122
Elicitation 122
Interview failures 122
Discussion 123
Elicitation differences 124
Discussion 124
Subjects* spontaneous reservations .... 125
Discussion 126
Content categories 126
Involuntary behavior
request content categories 126
Discussion 130
Noncompliant behavior
request content categories 131
Discussion 132
Demographic and relationship data 135
Identifying information 135
Discussion 136
Relationship type 136
Discussion 137
Frequency and duration of
requests and responses . 140
Discussion 142
Research Questions 142
Group comparisons 142
Discussion ' 143
Satisfaction with responses 144
Discussion 146
ix
Satisfaction, compliance, and the
involuntary or noncompliant
nature of the response 148
Discussion 15]_
The Meaning and Negotiation of Involuntary
Behavior Requests and Noncompliant
Behavior Requests: A Qualitative Analysis
. 152
Overview 153
Case Illustrations 158
Summary 158
VI. CONCLUSION I73
FOOTNOTES 182
REFERENCE NOTES 183
REFERENCES 184
APPENDIX A 192
x
LIST OF TABLES
1. Spontaneous Comments on the Problematic
Nature of Involuntary Behavior Requests and
Noncompliant Behavior Requests 127
2. Relationship Type:
Involuntary Behavior Requests 138
3. Relationship Type:
Noncompliant Behavior Requests 139
4. Satisfaction with the Response Following an"
Involuntary Behavior Request or a
Noncompliant Behavior Request 147
x i
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Pragmatics of the Double Bind 50
2. Algebraic Expressions of the Three Kinds of"
Relationships that can Exist Between Two
Levels of Meaning in a Hierarchical System ... 79
3. Constitutive Rules 8i
4. Regulative Rules
t
* 82
5. Example of a Metarule
, 35
6. Metarule for a Paradoxical Reflexive Loop.
. . . . 91
7. Metarule for Contradictory
Double-level Communication 93
8. Metarule for the Request
for Involuntary Behavior 97
9. Metarule for Moncompliant Behavior Requests.
. . . 100
x i i
CHAPTER I
• OVERVIEW
Epimenides of Crete is credited with discovering the
curious meaning reversals generated by a statement like, "I
am lying." If the speaker lies, then the statement is true,
but if the speaker is telling the truth, then the statement
is a lie. This paradox has fascinated Western minds since
its discovery and has spurred several philosophical
developments in the 20th century. Russell and Whitehead
proposed their Theory of Logical Types in part to address
this kind of paradox in the form of Russell's set paradox.
Their argument was that the paradox derives from a confusion
of meaning levels and their solution was to declare such
confusions unacceptable. Godel later disagreed and asserted
that in any complex meaning system, there is a necessary
reflexivity which may confuse levels of abstraction and
generate paradox. In both the Theory of Logical Types and
in Godel's work, the Epimenides paradox has functioned to
stimulate thought on basic questions of truth and knowledge.
It is in part due to the attention given the Epimenides
paradox in 20th century philosophy that logical paradox was
introduced into the study of communication by Gregory
Bateson. Bateson was an original and wideranging theorist
whose interest in hierarchical patterns in nature and
2communication found a special resonance in the thinking of
Russell, Whitehead, and Godel on meaning levels in abstract
systems. His consideration of the parallel between meaning
levels in social interchange and meaning levels in
philosophical systems led to the conclusion that the logical
paradoxes described in philosophy must also occur in
ordinary communication. This provocative idea became a
major area of exploration in the study of interpersonal
communication
.
In the early 1950s, Bateson pursued his interest in the
idea of paradoxical communication through the organization
of a research team which eventually included Don Jackson,
William Fry, John Weakland, and Jay Haley. This group
initially described and studied "paradoxes of abstraction"
in communication which may be defined as the contradictions
which occur between messages delivered at different meaning
levels. When Bateson's group turned their attention to
schizophrenic communication, they dropped an explicit focus
on paradox and instead described a new communication form
called the "double bind." The distinction between paradox
and the double bind was never clarified, however, and
paradox continued to be associated with the powerful traps
and evasions of communication in the families of
schizophrenics
.
A return to an explicit focus on paradoxical
communication was provided by Haley (1963) who, in
Strategies of Psychotherapy
, argued the significant
influence of paradox in a range of interactional phenomena
including ordinary communication in close relationships,
hypnosis, and therapeutic intervention. Watzlawick, 3eavin,
and Jackson (1967) continued to focus on paradox as a
powerful communication form in their extremely influential
book, Pragmatics of Human Communication
, subtitled A Study
o_f Interactiona l Patterns, Patho l ogies, and Paradoxes
. The
works of these authors established paradox as a highly
significant aspect of communications theory and research.
The continuing fascination of communications theorists with
paradox is highlighted by the more recent writings of Vernon
Cronen, Barnett Pearce, and their colleagues in their
Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) model of human
communication. They propose a re-evaluation of paradox as a
type of necessary reflexivity in the negotiation of social
communication (Cronen, Johnson, and Lannamann, 1982; Pearce
and Cronen, 1980).
In addition to functioning as a focus for theoretical
exploration, paradox has also been widely discussed in the
context of therapeutic influence and intervention. Haley
and Watzlawick and his colleagues argued the position that
therapeutic symptom prescription may be understood as a
variety of paradoxical communication and numerous clinical
reports have documented the efficacy and explored the
operation of this technique. The publication of the Milan
4Group's book, Paradox and Counterparadox (Selvini Palazolli,
Boscolo, Cecchin, and Prata, 1978) provoked fresh enthusiasm
for the use of therapeutic paradox as well as new
theoretical efforts to account for its usefulness.
This brief overview of the paradoxical communication
literature suggests the range of phenomena to which this
concept has been applied. The purpose of this dissertation
was to reconsider this literature through the use of
conceptual analysis and an exploratory empirical study.
Using both conceptual and empirical approaches, two issues
are investigated: (1) what communication forms should be
considered paradoxes of the Epimenides variety? and (2) how
should the power of paradoxical communication be understood?
Chapter II provides a conceptual review and critique of
the paradoxical communication literature based on the issues
of form and formal determinism. It is argued that three
communication forms have been described as paradoxical in
the literature while only one should be considered
paradoxical according to the definition used in the
literature itself. Contradictory double-l evel communication
and the request for invo luntary beha v ior are the
communication forms mistakenly described as paradoxical in
the literature while the request for noncomp l iant beha v ior
may be truly considered a paradox of the Epimenides variety.
Further, it is proposed that all three communication forms
described as paradoxical in the literature have ben
inappropriately viewed as intrinsically powerful. Theorists
have mistakenly viewed the meaning reversals associated with
logical paradox as necessarily driving ordinary interaction
in particular ways. This view is documented and critiqued
in Chapter II.
An alternative model of the three communication forms
described as paradoxical in the literature is presented in
Chapter III. Here the CMM framework for describing human
communication is used to specify the three communication
forms presented in Chapter II. It is argued that these
forms have no intrinsic influence on social interactions,
but rather are negotiated variously depending on social
context
.
Chapter IV presents the questions and method of an
exploratory empirical study of two particular communication
f orms--involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant
behavior requests. The study was designed to gather
descriptive information on how these requests are negotiated
in ordinary close relationships and to explore whether
formal differences in these requests are associated with
differences in their social negotiation. Further, two
particular research questions are addressed in the study.
First, do satisfying outcomes to involuntary behavior
requests and noncompliant behavior requests occur? Second,
when a response following one of these requests is perceived
as compliant, does satisfaction with the response correlate
6with the perception of the response as also involuntary or
noncompl iant? Chapter V presents the results of the study.
A qualitative analysis is also proposed which suggests the
importance of the dimensions of closeness and control in the
negotiation of involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests.
The dissertation concludes with a discussion of several
points in Chapter VI. First, the role of paradox in the
developing study of communication and family systems is
briefly explored with the goal of putting the dissertation
in perspective. Second, the results of the conceptual
critique are discussed in terms of recommendations for the
use of the concept of paradox in communication study.
Third, the empirical study is evaluated critically and
future directions for research are proposed. Finally,
clinical implications of the dissertation are commented
upon
.
CHAPTER II
FORM AND FORMAL DETERMINISM IN THE
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PARADOXICAL COMMUNICATION
This chapter provides a critical review of the
paradoxical communication literature with a focus on two
related issues: form and formal determinism. The issue of
form refers to questions about the structure of communication
described as paradoxical and is well precedented in the
literature. Many authors have been concerned with
specifying what forms of communication are and are not
paradoxical (e.g., Abeles, 1976; Dell, 1981; Rabkin 1976).
The issue of formal determinism refers to how a paradoxical
form of communication is understood to influence social
interaction. Despite the common assumption that paradox is
a powerful form of communication, this issue has not
received explicit attention in the literature.
The formal analysis presented here departs from the
observation that a single formal definition of paradox,
i.e., as a se 1 f - re f 1 ex i ve negative statement, has been
applied to an extreme diversity of phenomena including
animal play, schizophrenia, and psychotherapy. A close
reading of the literature reveals that, in fact, three
distinct forms of communication have been labelled
paradoxical while only one should actually be considered
paradoxical according to the formal definition employed by
the theorists themselves. The two communication forms
inappropriately described as paradoxical are contradictory
double-level communication and the request for involuntary
behav ior
.
The request for non-compl iant beha v ior is a third
communication form which has been appropriately described as
paradox ical
.
The elaboration of formal distinctions might represent
an exercise in hairsplitting but for the ways in which
social influence has been attributed to communication
described as formally paradoxical. The fundamental error of
many theorists has been to assume that a logically
problematic message is necessarily problematic in actual
communication. This review will both document and critique
this assumption.
The chapter begins with an elaboration of the issues of
form and formal determinism in the paradoxical communication
literature. Following this, the three communication forms
described as paradoxical in the literature are reviewed.
The Formal Definition of Paradox
Used by Communication Theorists
Paradox is not a singular concept--it is used to refer
to a variety of pragmatic and conceptual phenomena in
everyday life and in philosophy. In ordinary social
9xchang e/ the term is commonly used in the sense of the
second definition given by Webster's New World Dictionary
(1974): "a statement that seems contradictory,
unbelievable, or absurd but that may be true in fact" (p.
1029). In this vein, the assertion, "the more money you
spend, the more money you have," is paradoxical and not
simply contradictory or absurd when you consider tax laws
that make investment more financially rewarding than simple
savi ng
.
In philosophy, a logical paradox "consists of two
contrary, or even contradictory, propositions to which we
are led by apparently sound arguments" (van Heijenoort,
1969, p. 45). This definition covers a variety of puzzles
and problems including the paradox of Achilles and the
Tortoise, the barber paradox, and the paradox of the
surprise quiz. Quine (1962) points out that logical
paradoxes may be resolved in three basic ways: through the
discovery of a hidden argument which shows the truth of the
paradox, through the discovery of fallacious reasoning which
shows the falsity of the paradox, and through an actual
modification of the system which generates the paradox.
Historically, paradoxes exist in a relative context-
yesterday's assumptions and accepted principles of thought
lead to paradoxes which rapidly dissipate when considered
under today's premises.
Communications theorists have referred to a particular
10
type of paradox which may be defined as a self-reflexive
negative assertion. The two most common examples are the
Epimenides or liar paradox and Russell's set paradox. This
type of paradox is addressed by Russell and Whitehead's
Theory of Logical Types which has also received considerable
attention, in itself, from communications theorists. In
order to appreciate the formal structure of this type of
paradox and the log ica 1 -types analysis addressed to it,
Russell and Whitehead's work on this topic will be outlined
here. Note that this discussion follows Hofstadter (1979).
The Theory of Logical Types was developed in response
to a paradox Russell discovered having to do with the
properties of sets. Russell reasoned that there are two
kinds of sets— sets which are not members of themselves,
e.g., the set of all apples is itself not an apple, and sets
which are members of themselves, e.g., the set of all things
which are not apples is itself not an apple. This
distinction is the basis for two sets of sets--the set of
all sets which are not members of themselves and the set of
all sets which are members of themselves. A paradox arises
when you ask, "Is the set of all sets which are not members
of themselves a member of itself?" If it is a member of
itself, then it is not a set which is not a member of
itself, and so it is not a member of itself. 'But if it is
not a member of itself, then it is a set which is not a
member of itself, and so it is a member of itself. To
11
condense, if it is a member of itself, it is not and if it
is not, it is.
Russell was concerned with this set paradox because the
reasoning involved in its construction appeared to utilize
only the most basic ideas of set theory. If these
intuitively correct ideas could lead to paradox, then doubt
was cast on their validity and if doubt could be raised
concerning the concept of set, where could it not arise?
Russell wanted to eliminate this source of uncertainty and
so joined with Whitehead in the effort to derive set theory
and mathematics from pure logic, the result being the three
volumes of "Principia Mathematica " and the Theory of Logical
Types
.
The Theory of Logical Types posits that a set
represents a higher order of abstraction than its members
and therefore a set cannot be a member of itself. Instead,
a hierarchy of levels exists with each set containing only
members or sets of a lower logical type. This rule forbids
the kind of reasoning which led Russell to his set paradox--
the presumption that a set can or cannot be a member of
itself is disallowed.
It will be useful in the subsequent analysis of
communication described as paradoxical to present a
distinction here: a violation of the Theory of Logical
Types does not, in itself, create a paradox, but only the
potential for paradox. In the first step of Russell's set
12
paradox, he proposes that a set may or may not be a member
of itself, but merely to say that a set is or is not a
member of itself is not paradoxical. For sxample, asserting
that the set of all apples is not an apple and so is not a
member of itself is not paradoxical. It is only when a
self-reflexive negative assertion is proposed that paradox
results. This is the essence of the paradox posed by the
attempt to classify the set of all sets which are not
members of themselves. The rule for inclusion in this set
is negati ve--to belong a set must not be a member of
itself--and then this negative rule is applied reflexively
to the set itself. The result is the curious entailment of
meaning reversals characteristic of this type of paradox.
The general interest of Logical Types theory might have
been limited but for its relevance to the ancient liar
paradox of Epimenides, "I am lying. "1 This statement is
considered paradoxical because it is true only if it is
false and false only if it is true. The application of
Log i ca 1 -Types theory to this paradox suggests that it is
formally equivalent to Russell's set paradox. A negative
statement, "I am lying," is proposed at an object level of
language--it is a statement itself--and simultaneously the
negative statement, "I am lying," is proposed at a
metalanguage level— it is a statement about a statement,
i.e., about itself. It is the se 1 f -re f 1 ex i v i ty of this
negative statement which creates paradox. According to
13
Logical-Types theory the way to avoid this paradox is to ban
as meaningless all confusions of language levels, not simply
those seen in se 1 f -ref 1 ex i ve negative sentences.
In communication theory, the Epimenides paradox has
been consistently referred to as a defining example of
paradox. The negative injunction, "Disobey me," has also
been frequently used as a defining example of paradox by
communication theorists because in order to obey this
directive, it must be disobeyed and vice versa. A logical-
types analysis reveals that this negative directive
simultaneously refers to an object level— it is itself an
injunction—and to a metalevel— it is an injunction about
how to respond to an injunction. This self-reflexive
confusion of levels involving a negative injunction would be
seen as the source of the paradox according to Log ica 1 -Types
Theory
.
Note that throughout this discussion the necessity of
negation in the formation of paradox has been emphasized.
This is due to the observation that se 1 f - ref 1 ex i v i ty , in
itself, does not generate the meaning reversals of paradox.
The set of a 1 1 sets which are members of themselves may not
be meaningfully classified as a member of itself, but it
does not generate paradox. In the same way, if I say, "I am
telling the truth," or "Obey me," I am confusing language
levels and the statements may be meaningless, but they are
not paradoxical. Fry (1963) also makes this point.
14
To summarize, the Theory of Logical Types addresses a
particular type of paradox, that which occurs when a
negative statement reflexively classifies itself. The
solution to this paradox proposed by the theory is never to
confuse a class and its members no matter if paradox is
thereby generated or not. For purposes of clarity, in this
dissertation, the term, "paradox," will only be used to
refer to the type of paradox addressed by Logical-Types
Theory, to repeat, a self-reflexive negative statement.
Before proceeding it should be noted that the effort to
disallow paradox embodied in the Theory of Logical Types was
overruled by Gddel's Incompleteness Theorem which showed
that Russell and Whitehead's goal of an entirely self-
consistent logical mathematical system was impossible, in
fact, "that no axiomatic system whatsoever could produce all
number-theoretical truths, unless it were an inconsistent
system" (Hofstadter, 1979, p. 24). Gbdel's work did not
deny that paradox may result from logical type confusions,
but proposed that these paradoxes are unavoidable in complex
logical systems. In this way, his work reinforced an
interest in paradox by communications theorists because of
its implication that paradox is an inevitable component of
human meaning systems (e.g., Cronen, Johnson, and Lannamann,
1982; Ruesch and Bateson, 1951; Watzlawick, Beavin, and
Jackson, 1967).
The Issue of Formal Hpi-^™, i n i sm
15
Formal causality is a philosophical concept which may
be traced to Plato and Aristotle. The basic idea is that
events are caused by the formal pattern which underlies
them. This type of explanation contrasts with the notion of
efficient cause, the idea that an antecedent event functions
as the direct stimulus for the event in question. For
example, when one billiard ball strikes another, the motion
of the first may be seen as the efficient cause for the
motion of the second. Usually, the idea of formal cause is
understood as a mathematical relation although originally
Plato argued that human actions are determined by their
adherence to ideal nonma thema t ica 1 forms, e.g., Socrates'
decision to face execution over escape into exile was caused
by his aspiration to the ideal form of honor (Averill,
1976). Averill (1981) explains that formal causality has
been applied in more recent times to abstract concepts in
the physical sciences, e.g., gravity may be understood as a
formal and mathematically expressible causal relationship
among material bodies.
Tn family systems theory, formal causality has been
involved implicitly in most concepts. Bateson's (1958)
original formulation of sch i smogenes i s , for example, posited
accelerating interactional spiral that could occur in a
ariety of contexts including paranoia, international
an
16
hostilities, and dominant-submissive marital roles. The
point is that a formal pattern was identified and used in an
explanatory fashion. Other family concepts such as
homeostasis, rules, and positive feedback utilize a similar
focus on formal relations.
The question raised by the use of formal concepts in
family systems theory is whether these concepts are only
meant to provide a descriptive summary of interaction or
whether they are understood as having a causal influence on
interaction. Theorists have approached this issue
differently. Jackson (1965) stressed the descriptive aspect
of family rules, suggesting that rules do not determine
interaction, but are enforced in the process of interaction.
More recently, Hoffman (1981) has implied a deterministic
view of systemic form. Writing of complementary interaction
in families, she asserts that "the terms 'dominant' and
'submissive' are unfortunate because they suggest a power
struggle rather than a systemic sequence that ne i ther person
h as t he p ower to resist " (1981, p. 43; emphasis added).
Here Hoffman suggests it is the systemic pattern which
causes and not merely describes the interactional cycle.
In passing, it may be noted that the issue of formal
causality appears to be at the heart of the current
epistemology debate. In particular, Dell (1982) has
attacked the idea that homeostasis "causes" family behavior
and argues that the concept of "coherence" is more
17
appropriate to the understanding of family interaction.
According to Dell (1982), "coherence simply implies a
congruent interdependence in functioning whereby all the
aspects of the system fit together" (p. 31); there is no
implication of causality, circular or otherwise.
Unfortunately, Dell's substitution of the concept of
coherence for homeostasis begs the question of formal
causality by denying the relevance of any kind of causal
explanation to family interaction.
The role of formal causality in family systems
explanations of behavior represents an issue which cannot be
fully explored here. It is raised because it provides a
useful context for understanding why paradox has been
considered a powerful determinant of interaction. This is
because of the similarity between the idea of formal
causality and the idea that a paradoxical form of
communication determines interaction. In developing
systemic explanations, theorists focussed on formal patterns
in relationships with an implied belief in the form as the
cause of behavior. Within this shift in assumptions about
the explanations of interaction, the idea that a paradoxical
form of communication could influence interaction took hold.
Both the idea of formal causality and the idea of the
determining influence of a paradoxical communication form
share an assumption of form as cause. A distinction,
however, must be made between these two ideas. Formal
18
causality represents a type of explanation in which an
underlying form is seen as the source of behavior whereas
the idea that a paradoxical communication form determines
interaction is based on the form as an initiating condition
of interaction. The force of paradoxical communication
stems from the formal nature of the message as the stimulus
for a particular type of interaction. In this sense, the
communication form is seen more as an efficient cause of
behavior. In the discussion which follows, the idea that a
communication form forces interaction in a particular
direction is referred to as formal determinism and this
concept should be considered distinct from the idea of
formal causality.
In general, communication described as formally
paradoxical has been understood as a determining influence
in phenomena ranging from schizophrenia to hypnosis to
therapeutic change. Repeatedly, it is the paradoxical form
of the communication which has been seen as a pathogenic
agent in severely disturbed human relationships and at the
same time the remedy for these ills through therapeutic
intervention. The title of the Milan Group's (Selvini
Palazolli et al., 1978) influential book, Paradox and
Counter-paradox , refers to this basic theme.
The attribution of power to communication described as
formally paradoxical derives most importantly from the
oscillation of meaning generated by paradox. This dynamic
19
has received both direct and indirect reference in the
literature. Haley (1963) writes explicitly that a person
faced with the directive not to follow the directive, i.e.,
a "Disobey-me" paradox, is in an impossible situation: "The
receiver cannot obey the directive nor disobey it. If he
obeys the directive not to follow directives, then he is not
following directives" (p. 17). Watzlawick et al. (1967)
distinguish paradoxical from contradictory communication by
referring to the dynamic of vicious-circle reasoning: "The
paradoxical injunction, on the other hand, bankrupts choice
itself
,
nothing is possible, and a self-perpetuating
oscillating series is set in motion" (p. 217; emphasis in
the original). Abeles (1976) stresses the same issue in
describing the effects of paradox in communication and
writes that responding to this form of communication "is
something like turning on the light to better inspect the
dark; you simply cannot do it" (p. 119). These theorists
express the belief that the logical properties of paradox
generate significant problems in communication.
Implicit reference to the power of paradox in
communication is made when the Epimenides or "Disobey-me"
paradox is used as a defining example. This is because the
meaning reversals generated by these paradoxes are presented
with the implication that such effects naturally follow in
ordinary communication. The impression is given that
paradox in ordinary communication creates the same elusive
oscillation of meaning as it does when considered in a
logical context.
The discussion of formal determinism and paradox is
complicated by two additional factors— one formal and one
pragmatic. First, theorists have described nonparadox ica
1
messages as paradoxical and then have implicated the
particular form m i s iden t i f i ed as paradoxical in determining
interaction. As we shall see, the best example of this is
the request for involuntary behavior. Although not formally
paradoxical, this type of request is formally impossible
—
involuntary behavior cannot count as compliant beha v ior--and
theorists have referred to this formal contradiction in
explaining why this type of message is powerful.
The second problem with the discussion of how formal
paradox has been understood to affect interaction is that
very often theorists have confused the issue of form with
the pragmatic negotiation of form. The double bind, for
example, has been assumed to be paradoxical but its impact
on behavior has also been discussed in terms of the
punctuation of that form in interaction. Theorists have
implied that the double bind is a powerful communication
form while often failing to appreciate that its power
derives from a form that is negotiated in a particular way.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that Bateson
(1972, 1978, 1979) himself emphasized the limits of logic as
a model for the world of cause and effect using paradox as
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an example. The contrast that he draws is between what
happens when paradox is encountered in the abstract world of
logic and in the ordinary world of cause and effect. In the
former, the discovery of paradox invalidates the entire
system in which it is located while in the latter, for
example in a computer, paradox may only be modeled through
oscillation of "yes-no" circuits. Bateson writes:
The computer never truly encounters logical
paradox, but only the simulation of paradox in
trains of cause and effect. The computer
therefore does not fade away. it merely
oscillates [1972, p. 281].
Given that most theorists addressing the effects of paradox
in human communication have focussed on just this
oscillation of meaning, it is unfortunate that Bateson did
not more specifically answer the question of what happens
when a person instead of a computer encounters paradox.
Bateson makes it clear that the person would not disappear
but would an oscillating contradiction parallel to the
computer's "yes-no" cycle be generated? Bateson suggests
that a shift to a metalevel is possible, i.e., commenting on
the impossible nature of the communication, but he appears
never to have said exactly what a human being confronted
with paradox would do.
The conceptual basis for rejecting formal determinism
in communication described as paradoxical is simply that
meaning and action are negotiated in a social context. In
other words, logic does not compel human belief or behavior.
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This point has been underlined by several contemporary
writers (Gergen, 1981; Hofstadter, 1979; Winch, 1958)
through reference to an imaginary dialogue constructed by
Lewis Carroll (1895) between Achilles and the Tor to i se-- two
characters borrowed from Zeno's paradox. In this
conversation, the Tortoise asks Achilles to convince him to
accept a proposition 'Z' that follows logically from two
propositions, 'A' and 'B,' that he (the Tortoise) already
accepts. The Tortoise grants intermediary propositions--
e.g., 'C (If A and B are true, then Z must be true)— but he
continues to defer acceptance of Z itself. When the
Tortoise asks the exasperated Achilles, "Suppose I still
refuse to accept Z?" Achilles exclaims: "Then Logic would
take you by the throat and for ce you to do it! . . . Logic
would tell you 'You can't help yourself" (Carroll, 1895, p.
280)! But the Tortoise can help himself and the dialogue
continues indefinitely. The moral of the story is that the
irresistibility of logic operates in a formal, not a
pragmatic, sphere.
The implication of Carroll's anecdote for communication
described as paradoxical is obvious--the vicious-circle
meaning reversals generated logically by paradox do not
necessarily occur in ordinary communication, much less
paralyze the process of social interaction. In Chapter III,
the question of how the logic of paradox may be implicated
in communication will be discussed.
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Contradictory Double-LevM r n , ion
This communication form may be defined as the presence
of contradictory messages delivered at two distinct levels
of abstraction. The meaning of such a communication is
derived from the hierarchical relationship of the
contradictory messages, i.e., the higher level message
influences the interpretation of the lower level message
(Cronen et al., 1982). in the paradoxical communication
literature, three types of contradictory double-level
communication have been described as paradox ica 1 --these
types may be distinguished on the basis of the contextual
hierarchy of the contradictory messages.
In the "paradoxes of abstraction" the contextual
hierarchy between messages is clear, although subject to
negotiation, and the meaning of the communication is
relatively stable. This form was originally described by
Bateson (Ruesch and Bateson, 1951) in his analysis of how
the message defining a context as unreal, e.g., in play,
ritual, or art, is communicated and was applied by Haley
(1955) to psychotherapy and fantasy and by Fry (1963) to
humor. More recently, Harris (1980) has presented a
commun ica t iona 1 analysis of a married couple's interactions
in which she identifies several paradoxical rules. At least
one of these rules may be better understood as defining a
"paradox of abstraction."
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The second type of contradictory double-level
communication described as paradoxical is the "strange loop-
applied recently by theorists of the CMM approach to human
communication (Cronen et al., 1982; Pearce and Cronen,
1980). The strange loop consists of two contradictory
messages in a balanced hierarchical re 1 a t ionsh ip--each is
equally likely to be the context for the other--and the
meaning of the communication cannot be established without
additional information. This form has been used to
understand transitional episodes in developing relationships
and has also been applied to meaning shifts in the dynamics
of alcoholism (Cronen, Note 1).
The third type of contradictory double-level
communication described in the literature as paradoxical is
the double bind (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, and Weakland,
1972). Here the contextual relationship of the
contradictory messages is enforced such that the meaning of
the communication reverses over time. The double bind has
been the focus of sustained empirical and conceptual
i nteres t--th i s literature will be briefly reviewed with a
focus on understanding the conceptualization of the double
bind as paradoxical.
The paradoxes of abstraction
The introduction of paradox into the study o
f
communication began with Bateson's (Ruesch and Bateson,
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1951) consideration of contexts such as play, ritual, and
art in which the message that the activity is not the
activity it represents must be conveyed. Bateson argued
that this message is the equivalent of the paradox, "I am
lying," and it was this idea which was the focus for the
initial research of his Palo Alto group. The most explicit
explanation (still more evocative than precise) of how
Bateson understood these paradoxes of abstraction appears in
his paper, "A Theory of Play and Fantasy" (1972). As noted
above, this particular conceptual use of paradox was applied
by Haley (1955) to fantasy and psychotherapy and later by
Fry (1963) to humor. Interest in the paradoxes of
abstraction faded with the inception of the closely related
double-bind theory, but reference to the conceptualization
is implied when theorists write of the role of the double
bind or paradox in play, fantasy, humor, and ritual (e.g.,
Bogdan, 1982).
Although Harris (1980) does not link her analysis to
these paradoxes of abstraction, her recent study describes
communication patterns which are appropriately understood in
terms of this communication form. Because Harris's work is
distinct from that of Bateson, Haley, and Fry, her paper is
examined separately in this section.
Bateson's initial reference to the paradoxes of
abstraction (Ruesch and Bateson, 1951) seemed to derive
deductively from his recognition that, given a multilevel
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communication system, "contradictions of the Russellian type
must creep in" (p. 223). Specifically, he noted that some
such contradiction must be present in human activities like
play. Later he addressed this conceptualization to the
problem of how monkeys are able to communicate the
difference between playful behavior which resembles hostile
behavior and the hostile behavior itself (Bateson, 1972).
In other words, how could one act be labeled so as to be
distinguished from the act it represents? Here Bateson
begins to explore the question within a frame of levels of
abstract ion--an idea taken from Logical Types Theory.
Regarding the monkeys, he argues that three messages are
required for play: mood signs or direct expressions of
particular meaning, e.g., a bite that inflicts pain;
simulation of mood signs, e.g., a relatively painless nip;
and signals which distinguish the first type of message from
the second. The message, "This is play," is of the third
type.
According to Bateson, paradox occurs in this
metacommun ica t i ve puzzle of animal play because the message,
"This is play," is a paradox of the Epimenides variety: "A
negative statement containing an implicit negative
metasta temen t" (1972, p. 180). Here Bateson hints that the
message, "This is play," is formally equivalent to the
message, "I am lying." However, his discussion of this
point suggests something different. He explains that the
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message, "This is play/' may be expanded to: "The playful
nip denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be
denoted by the bite" (1972, p. 180). This statement
violates the Theory of Logical Types and is paradoxical
according to Bateson because, "the word 'denote' is being
used in two degrees of abstraction and these two uses are
treated as synonymous" (1972, p. 180). Bateson seems to be
saying that the playful nip functions simultaneously at two
levels of abstraction— on a concrete level is the bite which
would normally count as hostile, but at a higher level the
differences between a bite and a nip, i.e., the playfulness
of the act, discounts this message of hostility. It is the
confusion of logical types— one message functioning on two
levels at once— that makes for paradox and for play.
While Bateson does not refer to the meaning reversals
of the Epimenides paradox in describing animal play, Haley's
(1955) and Fry's (1963) discussions of the paradoxes of
abstraction in human communication focus more on this theme
of contradiction. Haley notes that the enjoyment of
fantasy, e.g., watching movies, "is based on the fact that
the statements within the frame of the fantasy are both true
and untrue" (1955, p. 55). Here the emphasis is on the
simultaneous truth and falsity of the message within the
fantasy frame. Fry argues that the primary context of humor
is play and that the creation of this frame, as in animal
play, is paradoxical. Fry (1963) admits, however, that the
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exact role of paradox in this frame is unknown: "it is not
clear just how the never-ending oscillations of a 'vicious
circle' paradox result in pleasure to the human organism.
But that would seem to be the case" (p. 132).
The conceptual approach to the paradoxes of abstraction
presented by Bateson, Haley, and Fry represents an
essentially descriptive perspective. They argue that
paradox is necessarily present in the construction of
certain types of metacommunicat ions, but do not attribute
the creation of these abstractions to the formal influence
of paradox. This distinction can be lost due to the
enthusiasm of these theorists for the concept of paradox and
because of the significance attributed to it. Bateson
(1972), for example, writes that
without these paradoxes the evolution of
communication would be at an end. Life would
then be an endless interchange of stylized
messages, a game with rigid rules, unrelieved by
change or humor [p. 193].
Here Bateson verges on ascribing the development of
metacommunication to the influence of paradox, but in
general, the paradoxes of abstraction were described as
necessary outcomes and not causal forces in
metacommun ica t i on
.
A formal critique of the paradoxes of abstraction
depends on the interpretation of Bateson's regrettably
ambiguous presentation. (Haley and Fry follow Bateson so
closely, they will not be discussed separately here.) On
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the one hand, it is easy to see that the message, "This is
play/' taken out of context may be considered paradoxical
and if Epimenides had said, "I am playing," there would be
no logical way to determine his meaning. if he was serious
he was playing and if was playing, he was serious. In
context, however, the message, "This is play," is not
paradoxical because it does not refer to itself, but rather
to ongoing behavior. Further, this message can be
considered a nonproblemat ic abstraction derived from the
observed difference between the nip and the bite. The
result is contradictory double-level communication in which
the higher level message functions in a relatively stable
fashion to significantly modify the meaning of lower level
beha v ior
.
An alternative interpretation of Bateson's analysis
suggests a different problem. It would appear that what
Bateson considered paradoxical about certain types of
context was the confusion between one level of abstraction
and another. He seemed to believe that play, humor, ritual,
and art all make functional use of this confusion by
implicitly expressing the contradiction, "This act is both
real and unreal." Of course, this sense of paradox
dissolves when the idea of distinct levels of abstraction i
invoked. The nip generates a context which modifies the
interpretation of the nip--two contextual levels are in
contradiction but there is no necessary ambiguity or
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conf us ion
.
Because Bateson, Haley, and Fry basically present a
descriptive approach in outlining the paradoxes of
abstraction, it is unnecessary to critique the idea of the
formal influence of paradox. What may be noted is that the
work of these theorists, especially Bateson, presented
paradox as a key focus for attention in understanding
communication. Perhaps by association, paradox took on an
aura of significance that would later assume the
characteristics of formal determinism. At the same time,
the formal application of the concept was so confusing as to
open the field to loose and formally unrigorous use of the
concept of paradox.
Harris's (1980) study was designed to explore the
reciprocal relationship between social reality and
communication through an in-depth analysis of one normal
couple. To her apparent surprise, she discovered that this
couple operated according to several contradictory rules.
For example, in daily conflicts, each partner insisted upon
change from the other--she demanded more affection and
appreciation while he asked her to be less nagging and
cr i t ica 1 --bu t in the couple's major confrontations, these
sources of dissatisfaction were labeled unchangeable
personality traits which must be accepted. Another
contradiction occurred during these confrontation sessions
because the couple understood their willingness to undergo
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as
the agonizing process of sorting through their conflicts
their greatest strength. Therefore, during these episodes,
the hostile content of the exchange was con tex tua 1 i zed by
the positive sense of commitment and concern.
Harris's assessment of her study couple's dynamics shows
wonderful insight into their relational contradictions. For
the present discussion, it is significant that she connects
these contradictions to logical paradox and also asserts
that it is this logic which frustrates the couple: "An
unrecognized paradoxical logic will restrict episodic
equifinality (behavioral choices)" (1980, p. 32).
Unfortunately, Harris fails to clarify how the
contradictions she describes contain the se 1 f -re f 1 ex i v i ty of
logical paradox. The first rule of the couple about the
necessity and impossibility of change expresses a
contradiction which unfolds over time. Se 1 f-ref lex i v i ty and
the generation of meaning reversals are not involved. The
second rule defining a hostile confrontation as friendly in
nature may be understood as a paradox of abstraction.
Contradictory messages are arranged in a stable contextual
hierarchy such that the episodic meaning is clear. Harris's
assertion that the couple's episodes were restricted by a
paradoxical logic is consistent with the trend in the
literature to ascribe formal influence to communication
described as paradoxical.
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The strange loop
The strange loop is a concept developed by Hofstadter
(1979) to refer to a range of reflexive phenomena including
logical paradoxes present in hierarchical systems of
meaning. It was introduced into the communications
literature by Pearce and Cronen (1980) in the context of
their Coordinated Management of Meaning (CM M) theory of
human communication. Originally, Pearce and Cronen used the
strange loop concept in the broad sense conveyed by
Hofstadter, but they also focussed on the concept's
application to self-consciousness in scientific
investigation, the fact that
if humans look closely enough at any phenomenon,
they will see their own reflections and their own
intellectual fingerprints, which must themselves
be understood as part of that phenomenon [1980,
p. 2].
Note that in moving to identify issues of consciousness,
Pearce and Cronen imply an equation of this problem with
logical paradox of the Epimenides variety.
Later, Cronen and Lannamann (Mote 2) shifted from using
the strange loop concept in a generic sense to the use of
the apparently equivalent term, "r e f 1 ex i v i ty , " again defined
through reference to logical paradox. The change in terms
was accompanied by a change in content focus as well. Now
the CM M researchers asked the question Bateson asked:
'"where do contexts come from? 1 " (Cronen and Lannamann,
Note 2, p. 3). Their conceptual framework posits the
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emergence of contextual frames out of interaction which
subsequently serve to modify the meaning of the interaction.
Building on this approach, Cronen, Johnson, and
Lannamann (1982) have recently presented a detailed formal
system within CM M theory for understanding reflexivity in
communication. They define reflexivity as existing
"whenever two elements in a hierarchy are so organized that
each j_s simultaneously the context for and within the
COntext 21 Ihe other " (Cronen et al., 1982, p. 95; emphasis
in the original). The strange loop is so named because the
particular elements in the reflexive relationship are
intransitive, i.e., the meaning of the communication changes
depending on which level of meaning is seen as the context
for the other.
Cronen et al. (1982) are somewhat ambiguous on the
question of whether the strange loop is a paradox. They
write that paradoxes are reflexive loops, but do not say
explicitly whether all reflexive loops including strange
loops are paradoxical. The implication is that reflexivity
is synonymous with paradox, but that the significance of
this formal configuration is negotiated in a social context
such that "only certain subclasses of loops are problematic
for social actors" (Cronen et al., 1982, p. 92). For both
the issues of form and formal determinism it will be assumed
that Cronen et al. (1982) see the strange loop as
paradoxical in form.
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An example of the strange loop discussed by Cronen et
al. (1982) is the developing romantic relationship between
Bob, and his friend, Jane. After several affectionate
episodes, Bob believes that his relationship with Jane is
committed and close. Accordingly, he takes the opportunity
on a subsequent date to express his warm feelings to Jane.
She, in turn, responds disconcertingly by making a joke.
Bob's dilemma is that if he sees a close-committed
relationship as the context for the joke, then Jane must be
kidding him because the relationship is so secure that jokes
are O.K. If, however, the episode of Jane's kidding is seen
as the context for the relationship, then Jane is probably
distancing and the relationship is not close and committed.
Cronen et al. (1982) describe this situation as a strange
loop because it is equally likely for the episode to be the
context for the relationship as the reverse and it makes a
big difference, especially to Bob, which way it goes.
A second example of a strange loop was recently
presented by Vernon Cronen at the 1983 Participant's
Conference in Structural, Strategic, and Systemic Family
Therapy (Note 1). Referring to Bateson's (1972) paper on
the alcoholic's battle with drinking and with Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA)
,
Cronen noted that a vicious-circle pattern
of meaning shifts may be identified in this context. If the
alcoholic accepts the AA life-script label of alcoholism,
s/he will no longer drink. Repeated episodes of sobriety
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may then come to con textua 1 i ze and reverse the AA life-
script label. How can the person be an alcoholic if s/he
never drinks? Once the life-script changes, then drinking
itself is redefined from being unacceptable to being
acceptable. The uncon tro 1 1 i ng drinking episodes which
inevitably follow then build towards the individual's re-
acceptance of the AA life-script label which results in
abstinence. This brings the person full circle and the
cycle may begin again.
This cycle may be described as a strange loop because
the oscillation which occurs derives from the ambiguity of
contextual levels. Within the life-script of an AA
alcoholic, abstinence is stably defined not as a sign of
control but as a sign of lack of control over drinking. A
strange loop occurs if this contextual ization is not
accepted by the drinker; abstinence becomes the context and
the life-script of being an alcoholic is rejected. Should
this contextua 1 i zat ion stabilize, the person may continue
ou t-of-contro 1 drinking without ever accepting the life-
script label of alcoholic. But in many cases, the problem
drinking does become the context and the life-script of AA
alcoholic emerges to redefine drinking as impossible. The
ambiguity of contextual levels characteristic of the strange
loop is well reflected in this continuing cycle.
With regard to formal determinism, Cronen et al. (1982)
do suggest that under certain conditions, "strange loops
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produce adverse personal and social consequences" (p. 105).
This statement hints that the authors see the strange loop
not only as a descriptive device but also as having a causal
influence on interaction. They imply that it is not
relational confusion which creates the strange loop, but
rather the strange loop which creates relational confusion.
This theoretical tendency in Cronen et al's. (1982) work,
however, is counterbalanced by their explicit rejection of
the idea that any reflexive form is necessarily problematic.
Thus these authors appear to be at a point of questioning
the issue of formal determinism without being quite willing
yet to give it up altogether.
A formal critique of the CMM discussion of reflexivity
and the strange loop as paradoxical derives from the
distinction between se 1 f -ref 1 ex i v i ty and emergent
reflexivity. The former describes the formal structure of
logical paradox— a negative statement which functions
simultaneously as the contextual and the contex tua 1 i zed
message. What the CMM theorists describe as reflexive
communication is emergent in structure. Out of interaction,
a context is abstracted which then qualifies subsequent
interaction. The passage of time prevents the self-
reflexivity of logical paradox. Formally, then, the CMM
concept of the strange loop may be described as a kind of
contradictory double-level communication. Two messages
opposed in meaning are balanced hierarchically such that
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ambiguity results unless additional information is provided.
Note that this balance does not operate like a logical
paradox in which meaning reversals are entailed. In the
example given above, if Bob sees a close-committed
relationship as the context for Jane's kidding, he is faced
with one meaning for her behavior, but this does not
logically entail the reverse meaning. if he sees her
kidding as the context for their relationship, he is faced
with another meaning, but again this meaning does not
reverse once it is identified.
The CMM theorists provide their own implicit critique
of paradox as formally deterministic through their emphasis
on the social construction of meaning in communication.
Therefore, no comment on this theme is needed here.
The double bind
The original paper
. In 1956, Bateson's Palo Alto
research group published their famous article, "Toward a
Theory of Schizophrenia" (Bateson et al., 1972). This paper
departs from a consideration of the parallel between levels
of abstraction in Log ica 1 -Types Theory and levels of meaning
in human communication. The authors argue that meaning is
-expressed and understood within a hierarchy of learned
communication modes. The negotiation of these modes or
contexts provides a descriptive frame for a variety of
communicational phenomena including play, humor, deception,
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learning, and schizophrenia.
In ordinary communication, a message is interpreted
within a context of mode identifying signals. For example,
the hostile message, "You're a lousy cook," may be delivered
during a cogenial social interaction (say, after an
outstanding meal which the cook insists is nothing special)
and in a friendly tone of voice such that the message counts
as teasing, not angry. Bateson et al. (1972) noted that a
schizophrenic might have difficulty interpreting this kind
of messageeither by taking it literally as an insult or in
an over-abstract manner as, for example, a mysterious
ritualistic sign of acknowledgement.
The schizophrenic's difficulty interpreting messages at
the proper level of meaning was thought by Bateson et al.
(1972) to be an adaptive response to a developmental context
characterized by double-bind communication. With respect to
the etiology of schizophrenia, Bateson et al. (1972) defined
the double bind in terms of a number of specific
"ingredients" including a vital relationship context in
which the recipient is confronted with contradictory
negative injunctions delivered at different levels of
communication. When the recipient takes one message as
context for the other and responds to it, she or he is
punished; yet when the recipient reacts to this information
and takes the second message as context for the first, his
or her subsequent action is also punished. This drives the
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recipient back to the first contextual orientation, she or
he is punished for this interpretation and so on.
Additional injunctions prohibit comment on the contradictory
communication and escape from the relationship. According
to the authors, the only solution to this dilemma is to
falsify external or internal communication, i.e., to become
schi zophrenic
.
The classic example of the double bind involves a
mother's visit with her hospitalized schizophrenic son.
When he hugs her, she stiffens, communicating nonverbal ly a
request for distance. When the son responds by backing off,
she asks, '"Don't you love me anymore?'" (Bateson et al.,
1972, p. 217) thereby communicating a request for closeness.
The contradictory double-level communication consists of:
(1) a nonverbal injunction to maintain distance and (2) a
verbal injunction to approach. If the son responds to one
injunction, he is punished for disobeying the second
injunction and if he responds to the second injunction, he
is punished for disobeying the first. The contextual
arrangement of the contradictory double-level communication
reverses depending on the recipient's behavior.
Since the original double bind paper is about
contradiction, it is ironic that it contains its own
contradiction. On the one hand, the double bind is
presented as an enduring and inescapable learning context in
schizophrenia. On the other hand, the double bind is also
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defined and discussed as the mere existence of contradictory
double-level communication in a significant relationship
which prohibits comment on the contradiction. This
definition omits several of the most important
characteristics of the first definition including the
necessity of repeated experience, punishment for obeying
either of the contradictory injunctions and the inability to
leave the field. The example provided by Bateson et al.
(1972) of the second definition of the double bind is
accordingly very different. They refer to an incident in
which an employee goes home early and a fellow employee
calls him up and asks, "'Well, how did you get there?" 1
(Bateson et al., 1972, p. 209; emphasis in the original).
Here the two contradictory messages are delivered at the
episodic and at the speech act level (Pearce and Cronen,
1980). If the episode--leaving early— is taken as context
for the question, then the question counts as a nonliteral
inquiry into the employee's reasons for leaving early.
However, if the question is taken as context for the
episode, the question counts as a literal one and the
episode as innocuous. In the actual example, this is the
interpretation the employee chose; therefore he responded to
the question with the answer, '"By automobile'" (Bateson et
al., 1972, p. 209). While the'employee may have been
uncomfortable in this situation, he was not being exposed to
the wrenching d i sconf i rma t ion theorized to occur in the
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schizophrenogenic family.
Additional conceptual ambiguity is conveyed by Bateson
et al.'s (1972) application of the double bind to positive
learning contexts such as Zen instruction and psychotherapy.
The defining element of these widely ranging examples of the
double bind is the existence of contradictory communication.
For the most part, this contradiction is described as
occurring between levels of communication, but the Zen
instruction and therapy examples show sequential
contradiction which is not accompanied by contradiction
between levels of meaning. This implicit focus on the
formal description of contradictory communication tends to
minimize the fact that this form is negotiated by social
actors in powerful ways. This implies a belief that the
form itself is powerful.
The double bind and paradox: the original authors
.
From the foregoing discussion, it should be apparent that
despite the common assumption in the literature that the
double bind constitutes a paradox, it was not so described
originally. There are various reasons why the double bind
has been mistaken for paradox and these will be discussed
here
.
One reason for the equation of the double bind and
paradox is that Bateson's Palo Alto research group's first
project was on the paradoxes of abstraction discussed above.
Further, when funding availability encouraged the group to
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focus on schizophrenia, the grant application which led to
the double bind formulation was phrased in terms of the
"'paradox'" which is '"generated when both learning and
deutero-learning (learning about learning) are, in some
sense negative'" (Bateson, in Haley, 1976, p. 67). After
the receipt of this grant, according to Haley (1976), the
term, paradox, was exchanged for the term, double bind.
Unfortunately, Haley fails to explain the rationale for this
change. One other implied equation of the double bind and
paradox by the original authors is found in the only other
paper they wrote together (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, and
Weakland, 1963). After noting their central interest in
Russellian paradoxes present in communication, they refer to
the double bind as a "learning context which included formal
sequences where he (the pre-schi zophrenic patient) was
forced to respond to messages which generated paradoxes of
this type" (p. 155). The implication is that the double
bind and Russellian paradox are equivalent terms.
Independent work by the original double-bind authors
suggests two distinct positions on whether the double bind
represents a paradox. Significantly, Bateson appears never
to have described the double bind as a paradox except in the
jointly authored paper mentioned above. Instead he retained
a focus on contradictory double-level communication and
continued to extend the application of this form, for
example, to animal learning and creativity, disinformation
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in WWII, and even to the problem of why mountain climbers
climb mountains (1978).
Bateson responded to conceptual and empirical
criticisms of the double bind by asserting that, "The
concept of the 'double bind^ is really not a theory but more
like a new language" (1966, p. 415; emphasis in the
original). For Bateson, the double bind appears to have
been a way of thinking about contradiction in the
hierarchical organization of communication. He apparently
understood logical paradox to be an intriguing model for
this type of contradiction, but the double bind seemed to
offer a more robust conceptual form and so he chose to work
with it.
In contrast with Bateson's move away from the
conceptualization of the double bind as a paradox, the other
double-bind authors emphasized this equivalence. The
identification of the double bind as paradoxical was
accomplished by these authors essentially through a
redefinition of the double bind. It will be useful to
address this point briefly in the work of Haley and the work
of Jackson and Weakland in collaboration with Watzlawick and
other Mental Research Institute (MRI) associates.
Haley clearly equated the double bind with paradox; his
description of the double bind in 1961 (published in 1976)
is very nearly replicated in his description of paradox in
1963. Interestingly, in both these presentations, Haley
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attempts to show the pragmatic problems generated by the
double bind or paradox. In each case he begins by defining
the communication form (i.e., the double bind or paradox) in
terms of contradictory messages delivered at different
levels of abstraction. Then he asserts that because this
contradiction exists between different levels of
abstraction, it is no ordinary contradiction, but one which
prevents a response. Significantly, Haley does not explain
why contradiction between messages of different levels of
abstraction is more problematic than other contradictions,
but instead presents the "Disobey me" paradox as if it were
an equivalent form and reasons from the meaning reversals it
generates to support his argument that the double bind or
paradox is no simple contradiction. To further support his
position that the double bind or paradox is impossible to
respond to, Haley presents the "Be spontaneous" injunction
as an example of this type of communication. The problem
with Haley's argument is that he moves from describing two
contradictory messages expressed at different levels of
abstraction to an example, "Disobey me," of one negative
message functioning at two levels of abstraction
simultaneously. This represents a subtle, yet significant
formal redefinition of the double bind, one which allows
reference to the meaning reversals of paradox in support of
the pragmatic impossibility of responding to such an
injunction. Regarding the use of the "Be spontaneous"
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injunction as a second example of the impossibility of
responding to a double bind or paradox, note that this
message may be described formally in a least two distinct
ways as is shown in a subsequent section. Suffice to say for
the current argument that neither of these is a double bind.
The redefinition of the double bind as paradoxical by
Jackson and Weakland in collaboration with Watzlawick and
other MRI associates is presented most explicitly in
Pragmatics of Human Communication (Watzlawick et al., 1967).
Following the style (not the substance) of the original
paper, three "ingredients" of the double bind are presented.
Significantly, the presence of primary and secondary
negative injunctions is changed to a se 1 f -ref 1 ex i ve negative
assertion
:
In such a context, a message is given that (a) it
asserts something, (b) it asserts something about
its own assertion and (c) these two assertions
are mutually exclusive. Thus, if the message is
an injunction, it must be disobeyed to be obeyed;
it if is a definition of self or other, the
person thereby defined is this kind of person
only if he is not and is not if he is [Watzlawick
et a 1 ., 1967, p. 212 ]
.
Watzlawick et al. emphasize that the double bind is a
paradox and in doing so shift to a focus on the logical
meaning reversals entailed by paradox rather than the
enforcement of a no-win situation through conflicting
negative injunctions. In subsequent work by Watzlawick and
his colleagues including Weakland (Watzlawick, 1976;
Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch, 1974), the double bind is
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always treated as a paradox.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the equation
of the double bind and paradox presented by Haley,
Watzlawick, Jackson, Weakland and others appears to have
been motivated by the desire to present the double bind as
formally distinct from other communication types. This
formal distinction was presented in terms of the meaning
reversals of paradox— these were considered responsible for
making any response impossible. The emphasis on formal
determinism is clear.
The double bind and paradox: the larger field
. Early
conceptual work on the double bind by researchers other than
the original authors shows an inconsistent description of
the double bind as paradoxical. This, of course, follows
naturally from the conceptual confusion described above.
Some authors (e.g., Ferreira, 1960) extended the
contradictory double-level communication form to other
family interaction patterns, while others emphasized the
paradoxical nature of the double bind. Sluzki, Beavin,
Tarnopolsky, and Veron (1977), for example, described a
communication pattern called transactional disqualification
in which sequential statements in family sessions were shown
to manifest a lack of clear acknowledgement for the speaker.
They described this pattern as a double bind which they
stated is a paradox. Sluzki and Veron (1971) discuss the
"Be spontaneous" injunction as a universal pathogenic
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communication and clearly assert that it is a paradox and a
double bind.
In contrast with early conceptual work, early
experimental work on the double bind tended to emphasize the
"ingredients" definition of the double bind although there
was no explicit rejection of the idea that the double bind
is a paradox (Abeles, 1976).
Not surprisingly, reviewers of double bind research
have criticized the lack of clarity and specificity in a
concept which applies to so many disparate situations
(Mishler and Waxier, 1966; Olson, 1972; Schuham, 1967). But
it appears that Schuham is the only reviewer to distinguish
the definition of the double bind as contradictory double-
level communication and as paradox. While noting the
difference between the double bind in which a correct choice
is described as impossible and paradox in which choice
itself is described as impossible, Schuham does not pursue
the implications of this distinction.
Interestingly, several recent conceptual and empirical
treatments of the double bind have stressed the importance
of paradox. Abeles (1976), Ackerman (1979) and Rabkin
(1976) all present reformulations of the double bind with a
focus on paradox and relationship. Abeles (1976) asserts
that, "Double bind theory is about rel ationships, and what
happens when important basic relationships are chronica 1 ly
subjected to inval idation through paradox ica 1 interaction "
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(PP. 115-116; emphasis in the original). Ackerman (1979)
suggests that the double bind represents a "relational
paradox" in which "the logical-type error is buried in an
interactional sequence" (p. 30). Rabkin (1976) proposes
that the double bind is not a single paradox which he argues
is a request for systems change, but rather two paradoxical
injunctions which contradict each other. The point here is
that rather than becoming less associated with logical
paradox over time, the double bind appears to be
increasingly recast in terms of paradox.
The definition of the double bind as paradoxical has
prompted two empirical studies in which the effects of
paradoxical injunctions were investigated (Abeles, 1975;
Guindon, 1971). Notably, Guindon differentiated two types
of double binds
—
paradoxes and multilevel contradictory
communication. Both studies compared groups based on
psychopatho logy on their responses to paradoxical items.
Abeles found no support for differential difficulty of
paradoxical items while Guindon found that paradoxical items
compared with bimodal contradictory communication were seen
as more sincere, but more difficult to respond to. Note
that these studies of paradoxical injunctions posit that the
logic of paradox creates a pragmatic paralysis of response.
Cr i t ique . A formal critique of the double bind as
paradox depends, of course, on the definition of the double
bind. An attempt has been made to show that the double bind
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was first defined as contradictory double-level
commUnication and that it only la ter ca.e to be identified
with paradox, specifically with the "Disobey me" paradox and
the "Be spontaneous" injunction. These latter two forms
will be dealt with separately below and this discussion win
focus on the original "ingredients" definition of the double
bind
.
The double bind constitutes a pragmatic, but not a
formal paradox. This situation may be diagrammed in terms
of the contradictory negative injunctions and the
recipient's possible responses as shown in Figure 1. This
diagram shows that the recipient's compliance with one of
the injunctions simultaneously counts as defiance of the
other injunction. In a formal sense, no matter what
response is attempted, the recipient is simultaneously
compliant and defiant. Paradox-like meaning reversals
rather than simple contradiction is generated in the double
bind by the rule that only the defiant aspect of the
response is recognized by the person who delivers the
injunctions. The recipient takes one injunction as context
and attempts to comply with it, but the defiance of the
second injunction provokes punishment which is a message
that the second injunction is context for the first. The
recipient's attempt to respond to this injunction as context
for the first provokes a similar meaning reversal and so
back and forth. But this vicious circle is powered by the
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Recipient's Responses Contradictory Negative Injunctions
Do x or I'll
puiiibn you.
Don't do x or
I'll pun i sh you
.
Does x Compl iant Defiant
Does not do x Defiant Compl iant
Figure 1. Pragmatics of the double bind.
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pragmatics of punishment and not the logic of paradox. A
formal paradox is not present because two distinct messages
are delivered at different levels of abstraction rather than
a single se 1 f- ref 1 ex i ve negative injunction.
This leads us to the problem of formal determinism. it
seems clear that the double bind was redefined as a paradox
by Haley, Watzlawick, Jackson, and Weakland in order to
support a formally deterministic view of pathogenic
communication. They all argued specifically that the double
bind represents a paradoxical form of communication which
makes any response impossible. This position will be
examined below in the sections which deal with formally
impossible and formally paradoxical communication types,
i.e., involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant
behavior requests.
With respect to formal determinism and the double bind
as originally defined the issues are not so clear. Bateson
(1973) later noted that, "Already in 1956 ... we knew that
double binds were powerful, not only in a destructive or
painful sense, but also in a 'therapeutic' sense" (p. 57).
But in what sense did Bateson understand the power of the
double bind? Clearly his interest was in the description of
formal pattern, but these formal patterns were often
constituted by rules for action and response. Especially
the double bind represents a formal configuration defined by
pragmatic injunctions, "Do what I say or else." The
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question remains as to whether Bateson considered these
pragmatic injunctions to be reciprocally defined by their
formal configuration. One is tempted to conclude that some
such mutual defining relationship between form and power is
what he had in mind.
The Special Ca se of the "Be Spontaneous" Paradox
For most systems theorists, "Be spontaneous," is a
defining example of a paradoxical injunction because of the
assumption that a person cannot comply with a request
spontaneously. Perhaps because of its definitional role,
the term, spontaneous, has been used to refer to many types
of behavior ranging from symptoms (Haley, 1963) to
domination (Harris, Cronen, and McNamee 3 ) to enjoyment
(Watzlawick et al., 1974).
For the present formal analysis, it is necessary to
distinguish two contrasting meanings of "spontaneous," one
which corresponds more closely to involuntary behavior and
one which corresponds more closely to noncompliant behavior
In Webster's New Wor Id Dictionary (1974), the sense of
spontaneous as involuntary is given by the first definition:
"acting in accordance with or resulting from a natural
feeling, impulse, or tendency, without any constraint,
effort, or premeditation" (p. 1376). Note that
"spontaneous" and "involuntary" still refer to distinct
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experiences, when one acts impulsively, one may feel
carried away and lack a sense of purposefulness; but when
one behaves involuntarily, the experience is one of
compulsion, of having to do a certain thing.
The second definition of "spontaneous" given by
Webster^ New World Dictionary (1974) focuses on the feature
of self-determination as opposed to compliance: "having no
apparent external cause or influence; occurring or produced
by its own energy, force, etc. or through internal causes;
self-acting" (p. 1376). In this sense spontaneous behavior
cannot be compliant and could refer to independent,
disobedient, or dominant behavior. Again, note that each of
these behaviors has a specific and distinctive meaning of
its own.
The reason for distinguishing the meaning of
"spontaneous" as involuntary and as noncompliant is that
requests for these behaviors entail distinct formal
implications. As will be seen below, the former is not
paradoxical in form while the latter is.
The Request for Involuntary Behavior
Involuntary behavior is passively experienced and
includes emotions, psychological symptoms, and hypnotic
trance phenomena. The request for involuntary behavior has
been described as paradoxical because of the apparent
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contradiction involved in asking someone to do something
that cannot be done on purpose. This contradiction has led
theorists to argue that such requests in ordinary
relationships are necessarily frustrating and potentially
pathogenic. if a father tells his daughter that she should
enjoy studying, a compliant response may not be acceptable;
he may think she only studies because she has been told to
and not because she really enjoys it. In therapy, the
presumed impossibility of complying with a request for
involuntary behavior has been used strategically in the form
of "symptom prescription." An anxious patient may be told
to make an effort to be even more anxious; the d i f f icu 1 ty of
being anxious on purpose may inhibit the symptom. Finally,
the basic request in hypnotic trance induction is for
involuntary behavior. Interestingly, in this context, the
request is negotiated in such a way that the involuntary
response is not inhibited, but is actually produced. The
hypnotist tells the subject his or her arm will lift and
when the arm rises, the response is experienced as
involuntary by the subject.
The application of a formal definition of paradox to
the request for involuntary behavior has been advanced
primarily by Haley and Watzlawick and his colleagues. Haley
(1958) first presented a formal analysis of involuntary
behavior requests in hypnosis; at that time he described
such requests as double binds. As mentioned above, Haley
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(1963) later substituted paradox for the double bind and in
StratgqleS Si Psychotherapy he conceptualized the function
of involuntary behavior as paradoxical in the definition of
ordinary, hypnotic, and therapy relationships. Somewhat
later, Watzlawick and his colleagues (Watzlawick, 1976,
Watzlawick et al., 1967, Watzlawick et al., 1974) also
argued that the request for involuntary behavior is formally
paradoxical. Their emphasis was on ordinary and therapeutic
communication.
In therapeutic contexts, the request for involuntary
behavior, i.e., symptom prescription, has been discussed by
theorists representing behavioral, humanistic-existential,
and family systems perspectives (Newton, 1968; Rabkin, 1977;
Raskin and Klein, 1976). The behavioral (Dunlap, 1928,
1930, 1942) and humanistic-existential (Frankl, I960, 1975)
approaches to understanding symptom prescription have not
made use of formal definitions of paradox or the formal
influence of paradox. In family systems treatments of
therapeutic paradox, the work of Haley and Watzlawick and
his colleagues has been extremely influential and their
publications are typically cited as standard references.
However, it is important to note that most family systems
discussions of therapeutic paradox have not emphasized the
formal analysis presented by Haley and Watzlawick and his
colleagues. Instead, these family systems explanations of
therapeutic paradox have focussed on various other factors
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including the redefinition of the symptom (Papp, 1981;
Selvini Palazolli et al., 1978), the provocation of patient
resistance (Tennen, Press, Rohrbaugh, White, 1981), and more
recently the nature of the whole family system's orientation
to change (DeShazer, 1982; Hoffman, 1981; Stanton, 1981).
In fact, the definite rejection of a formal analysis of
therapeutic paradox by family systems theorists is suggested
by the reactions to Dell's (1981) recent critique of formal
confusions in the explanation of therapeutic paradox. While
Watzlawick (1981) endorses the value of formal
clarification, Selvini Palazolli (1981) frankly admits that
the question of what is a "real paradox" is of no interest
to her and her colleagues, and Jesse and L'Abate (1981)
assert a similar indifference toward formal issues in favor
of a focus on the "phenomeno 1 og ica 1 world view of the
client" (p. 43). The present critique of the paradoxical
communication literature is based on a similar objection to
the relevance of formal paradox as a determining factor in
human interaction, but it is also believed that because of
its importance in the field, this issue deserves a critical
review rather than a simple rejection.
In this section, Haley's conceptualization of the
request for involuntary behavior in hypnosis is reviewed
first. Following this, Haley's and Watzlawick and his
colleagues' views on therapeutic paradox are discussed.
While Haley refers to the request for involuntary behavior
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as paradoxical in ordinary relationships, it is Watzlawick
and his colleagues who have provided the more elaborate
conceptualization of this type of communication. Therefore,
their work on this topic provides the basis for the
discussion of the request for involuntary behavior in
ordinary relationships. A recent and distinctive approach
by Rabkin (1976, 1977) to involuntary behavior requests in
ordinary relationships is also discussed.
The request for involuntary behavior in hypnosis
Haley's discussion of the interactional dynamics of
hypnosis emphasizes the ways in which the hypnotist
maintains control of the definition of the relationship with
the subject. He also argues that the hypnotic injunction as
a request for involuntary behavior is formally equivalent to
the "Disobey me" paradox. Essentially, he accomplishes this
through asserting the contradictory nature of the request
for involuntary behavior:
Indeed whenever one requests 'involuntary'
behavior from another person he is inevitably
requesting that the subject do something and
simultaneously requesting that he not do it
[1963, pp. 33-34].
Haley implies that this contradiction is between levels of
abstraction and with this assertion basically arrives at the
definition of the double bind or paradox previously
discussed. As in his treatment of double-bind or
paradoxical communication, Haley then cites as an example,
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the "Disobey me" injunction, noting the respondent's
dilemma: "if he obeys, he is disobeying and if he disobeys,
he is obeying" ( 196 3, p. 35) .
While Haley focuses on the hypnotist's interpersonal
skill in negotiating the subject's resistance to the trance
induction, he also clearly asserts the formal influence of
paradox in hypnosis. Interestingly, he does not directly
refer to the meaning reversals of the "Disobey me" paradox
in supporting this view (this is implied) but instead to
contradictory (presumably) double-level communication:
If one is asked to do something and
simultaneously asked not to do it, one cannot
ref use to follow suggestions. If the
-
subject
responds or if he does not respond he is doing
what the hypnotist requests
. . . [ 1963, p. 36;
emphasis added].
The important point to be drawn from this is Haley's
emphasis on the formal nature of the hypnotic injunction and
power of this form— the subject cannot resist.
The formal critique of Haley's assertion that the
request for involuntary behavior is paradoxical is that
nowhere does he show how such a request represents a self-
reflexive negative statement. Haley writes that the request
for involuntary behavior is contradictory. The subject is
told to do something and simultaneously told not to do
something. This is an interesting assertion, but it might
be more accurate to say, as in fact Haley does, that the
subject is "influenced to do what he is told and
simultaneously deny that h_e is doing anything" (1963, p. 33;
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emphasis in the original). This slightly distinct version
of the request captures the contradictory aspect of the
request for involuntary behavior without recourse to an
artificial description in terms of contradictory double-
level communication. in any case, as we have already seen
in the discussion of Haley's analysis of the double bind as
a paradox, the mere presence of contradictory double-level
communication does not necessarily generate paradox.
Regarding formal determinism, Haley's own discussion of
hypnosis provides the best grounds for rejecting paradox
itself as influencing interaction. This is because Haley
shows that the formally impossible request for involuntary
behavior does not necessarily prevent a successful response
but rather may be negotiated in such a way that an
involuntary response is actually achieved. It is puzzling
that Haley should have continued to emphasize the
determining power of paradox when he so clearly described
the different ways these requests could be managed. In
ordinary interaction, as we have sen in the section on the
double bind, Haley argued that a paradoxical request is
inherently pathogenic, while in hypnosis, he described no
such disruption. The question remains, why didn't Haley see
that requests for involuntary behavior might have positive
results in ordinary relationships parallel to those observed
in hypnosis?
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The request for invo luntary behavior in therapy
Haley (1963, 1973) discusses two distinct uses of the
request for involuntary behavior in a therapy context.
First, he refers to traditional therapeutic modalities such
as psychoanalysis where the basic instruction to free
associate represents a request for involuntary behavior.
Here the use of the request for involuntary behavior is the
same as in hypnosis and the responses of the analyst are
designed, perhaps implicitly, to arrange for the patient to
actually comply with the request and to "involuntarily" say
whatever comes to mind.
The second application of the therapeutic request for
involuntary behavior discussed by Haley is the strategic
prescription of symptomatic behavior. In explaining this
injunction, Haley (1963) refers to the hypnotist's
encouragement of resistance in the subject. For example,
when a subject resists a suggestion to become drowsy by
maintaining an alert, vigilant attitude, the hypnotist may
encourage this very wakefulness. The goal here is two-fold.
If the subject continues to oppose the hypnotist, this must
be accomplished by becoming drowsy which is the intended
goal. If the subject remains wakeful, this now is defined
as a compliant response-- the hypnotist's authority is re-
established and the trance induction may proceed via an
alternate suggestion.
Although Haley does not acknowledge this, it would
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appear that his shift to describing the therapeutic request
for involuntary behavior in terms of the hypnotist's
encouragement of resistance is necessitated by the fact that
these directives are designed to either provoke an
oppositional response or to maintain the authority of the
hypnotist or therapist. in contrast, the more typical
hypnotic request for involuntary behavior is designed to be
fulfilled. This may be seen in Haley's explanation of
symptom prescription. Haley writes that when the therapist
prescribes the symptom, the patient cannot continue to use
the symptom to control the therapy relationship, i.e.,
defeat the therapist's efforts to help the patient change:
If the patient continues with his symptoms, he is
conceding that he is following therapeuticdirections; if he ceases his symptomatic
behavior, he is conceding that he is following
the therapist's directions since this is thelarger goal of the therapist [1963, p. 54].
Here Haley resolves the request for involuntary behavior
into contradictory double-level messages; at the level of
the relationship, the message is "change," while at the
level of the intervention, the message is "don't change."
What Haley does not address is that the second message
itself is a request for involuntary behavior. In any case,
it is important to note that with respect to form, Haley's
identification of the symptom prescription with the "Disobey
me" paradox is more implied than explicit.
Watzlawick et al. (1967) basically follow Haley's
analysis in explaining the request for involuntary behavior
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in therapy. They describe symptom prescription
interchangeably as a therapeutic double bind or paradox and
write that it represents a contradictory double-level
injunction to change and not to change. Further, they point
to the fact that if the patient produces a symptom on
request, by definition the behavior is no longer
symptomatic: "If he complies, he no longer 'can't help it-
he does 'it,' and this as we have tried to show, makes 'if
impossible which is the purpose of therapy" (Watzlawick et
al., 1967, p. 241). Thus, if the patient resists the
injunction, change occurs and if the patient complies with
the injunction, change occurs. Significantly, Watzlawick et
al. do not explicitly draw the formal connection between
therapeutic symptom prescription and paradox per se; this is
impl ied
.
Both Haley's and Watzlawick and his colleagues'
discussions of therapeutic symptom prescription deemphasize
the formal parallel with paradox while emphasizing the
pragmatic i nescapab i 1 i ty of the intervention. Haley appears
convinced that it is the logic of the contradictory double-
level request which forces compliance from the patient. No
matter what the patient does, he or she is conceding
compliance with the therapist's directives. Watzlawick et
al. (1967) refer to symptom prescription as "the most
complex and powerful interventions know to us" and comment
that "it is difficult to imagine that symptomatic double
63
binds can be broken by anything other than counter double
binds" (p. 240). They too assert the inevitability of
change following a therapeutic symptom prescription, writing
that: "if in a pathogenic double bind the patient is
'damned if he does and damned if he doesn't,' in a
therapeutic double bind he is 'changed if he does and
changed if he doesn't'" (p. 241).
It may be that the formal similarity between the
therapeutic request for involuntary behavior and paradox is
only implied by Haley and Watzlawick et al. because of the
differences between these two communication types. While
the request for involuntary behavior represents a formally
impossible request in that it asks for behavior which cannot
be produced on purpose, it does not represent a negative
self-reflexive statement and the meaning reversals which
result from the effort to comply with such a request do not
occur
.
Regarding formal determinism, both Haley and Watzlawick
discuss the symptom prescription in terms of a contradictory
double-level message which forces compliance at one level or
the other. Neither addresses the fact that such double-
level requests make defiance as necessary as compliance or
the fact that this could be therapeutically damaging. In
addition, Watzlawick et al. focus on the formal
impossibility of complying with the request for involuntary
behavior. Both authors emphasize formal determinism rather
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than the pragmatic negotiation of the request for
involuntary behavior.
The request for involuntary behavior in ordinary
rel ationships
.
As mentioned above, it is Watzlawick and his
colleagues at MR I (Watzlawick et al., 1967; Watzlawick et
al., 1974) who have most explicitly addressed the request
for involuntary behavior in ordinary relationships. in
Pragmatics of Human Communication
, they (Watzlawick et al.,
1967) describe a number of "Be spontaneous" paradoxes which
include particular requests for emotional, i.e., involuntary
(Averill, 1980a, 1980b), responses. Examples of these
requests are, "You ought to love me," and "You should enjoy
playing with the children, just like other fathers" (p.
200). Later, in Change
, they (Watzlawick et al., 1974)
introduce a chapter on paradox with the example of a mother
who explains: "'I think what I am trying to say is: I want
Andy to learn to do things, and I want him to do things--but
I want him to want to do them'" (p. 6 2; emphasis in the
original). Here the request for the child "to want" to do
things is described by Watzlawick et al. (1974) as a "Be
spontaneous" request.
Watzlawick and his colleagues explain the paradoxical
nature of a request for involuntary behavior in terms of a
"be spontaneous" request. They do not explicitly address
the request for involuntary behavior per se, but their
examples show that they are referring to requests for
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involuntary behavior. Watzlawick et al. (1974) assert that
the structure of the "Be spontaneous" injunction is the sa.e
as the Epimenides paradox:
It imposes the rule that behavior should not be
rule-compliant, but spontaneous. This ruletherefore says that compliance with an external
rule is unacceptable behavior, since this samebehavior should be freely motivated from withinBut this basic rule, involving (the class of) all
rules, is itself a rule, it is a member of the
class and applies to itself [pp. 66-67].
In other words, Watzlawick et al. (1974) propose that the
"Be spontaneous" injunction represents a request for non-
rule compliant behavior which modifies itself, thus
generating paradox.
Watzlawick and his colleagues are probably the most
insistent of all the theorists who discuss paradox on the
determining influence of the form on interaction.
Watzlawick et al. (1967) state that anybody faced with a "Be
spontaneous" request is in an "untenable position" (p. 200)
and they further assert that, "Where paradox contaminates
human relations, disease appears" (p. 201). Notably,
Watzlawick and his colleagues focus on the formal and not
the pragmatic aspects of paradox, thus indicating that it is
the particular form of paradox that creates problems in
human relationships and not how these forms are negotiated
in a social context.
A formal critique of Watzlawick and his colleagues'
description of paradoxical communication departs from the
observation that they translate the request for involuntary
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behavior first into a request for spontaneous behavior and
then into a request for noncompliant behavior. As discuss
in the section on the "Be spontaneous" request, the
definition of spontaneity as noncompliance is only one of
two possible definitions. Having recast the request for
involuntary behavior into a request for noncompliant
behavior it is possible to argue that a self-reflexive
negative statement is involved, i.e., it is a "Disobey me"
paradox. However, while involuntary behavior cannot be
compliant behavior it also cannot, by the same token, be
noncompliant. For example, a father asks his daughter to
bring him a glass of iced tea. If she trips on the way
over, the father makes an evaluation of whether or not she
could help it. If she couldn't help it, the behavior is
considered involuntary and not noncompliant or disobedient
The position maintained by Watzlawick and his
colleagues that the formal structure of the request for
involuntary behavior necessarily generates relationship
problems must be rejected. Despite a formal impossibility
in the request for involuntary behavior, in ordinary
relationships, as in hypnosis, such a request may be
successfully fulfilled. This is because ongoing behavior
a mixture of active and passive experience and the
attribution of activity or passivity to an experience is, :
general, determined in a social context (Averill 1980a,
1980b). This means that ongoing behavior is a mixture of
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voluntary and involuntary behavior. Consider the example of
sleep. This behavior is ordinarily a function of a series
of actions-getting undressed, going to bed, turning out the
light-and a passive experience of actually falling asleep.
While these active and passive behaviors do not necessarily
go together, e.g., in the case of insomnia, generally they
combine in a highly predictable way. This leads to a second
point-namely, that a person may indirectly produce an
involuntary behavior by producing the cognitive and physical
behaviors which typically form its context. This is the
basis for dramatic acting (Fletcher, Note 4) and for the
fact that a request for involuntary behavior may be
successfully obeyed.
Rabkin proposes a view of involuntary behavior requests
in ordinary relationships similar to the one presented here.
He, too, argues that such requests are a natural part of
everyday interaction and that they are regularly fulfilled.
His perspective on these requests, however, emphasizes a
formal systems analysis.
Like Watzlawick and his colleagues, Rabkin does not
propose an analysis specific to involuntary behavior
requests, but rather refers broadly to paradoxical
injunctions. His examp 1 es--s 1 eep, hypnosis, en joyment--show
that he is concerned with involuntary behavior. Rabkin
suggests that the I order you to enjoy school 1 injunction
is somewhat like Epimenodes' [sic] paradox in which the man
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from Crete tells us that all men from Crete are liars"
U976, p. 293), but never draws the complete formal
Parallel. This is because the connection between these two
"paradoxes" is more evocative than precise-according to
Rabkin, both appear to be truthful contradictions.
Rabkin proceeds to argue that the so-called paradoxical
injunctions only seem contradictory or absurd because they
are the best our language can do with describing the request
for systems change. For example, when parents request their
child to enjoy school, Rabkin points out that "the goal of
the paradoxical injunction is a transformation of the entire
personality and not just a developmental improvement" (p.
301). The request signals the desire for change in the
system, for a leap to a new level of integration. Rabkin
asserts that given such an injunction, an appropriate
response may be "achieved," i.e., successfully accomplished.
As noted above, Rabkin sees the double bind as a situation
in which two requests for systems change contradict each
other
.
Rabkin's discussion of involuntary behavior requests in
ordinary relationships usefully incorporates the common
observation of successful negotiation of such requests. In
addition, he definitely moves away from the formally
deterministic perspective which has been critiqued here.
Paradoxical injunctions for involuntary behavior are recast
in terms of messages for desired systems change that may or
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may not have an effect.
Two critical points respecting Rabkin's analysis may be
raised. First, he does not clarify the formal distinctions
or similarities between logical paradox and involuntary
behavior requests. While he implies less of a connection
than theorists like Watzlawick and his colleagues, he still
keeps the Epimenides paradox as his starting point and in an
appendix to his 1976 article, he reviews aspects of Logical
Types Theory and Gbdel's refutation in support of the
acceptance of paradox in meaning systems. Thus he implies
acceptance of the traditional assumption of some close
connection between so-called paradoxes in everyday life and
logical paradox.
The second problem with Rabkin's analysis is that he
does not move beyond a formal analysis of interactions
surrounding involuntary behavior requests. He does not
explain or consider the possible meanings of various
"systems changes" which might be invoked through involuntary
behavior requests. Without some better understanding of
these content issues, a better understanding of these
injunctions is impossible.
The Request for Noncompliant Behavior
It is Watzlawick and his colleagues (Watzlawick et al.,
1967; Watzlawick et al., 1974) who have given the most
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attention to the request for noncompliant behavior in the
context of ordinary relationships. As noted above,
theorists have referred to the "Disobey me" paradox in
describing other communication forms as paradoxical, but i
is Watzlawick and his colleagues who have provided a more
explicit discussion of this injunction itself. Examples o
requests for noncompliant behavior include:
-"I wan t you
dominate me' (request of a wife to her passive husband)";
"'Don't be so obedient' (parents to their child whom they
consider too dependent on them)" (Watzlawick et al., 1967,
P. 200) and '"Be independent'" (Abeles, 1976, p. U9)
. Mor
recently Hoffman (1980, 1981) has presented a discussion of
the "be independent" injunction which closely follows
Rabkin's analysis. As her approach departs significantly
from the more traditional view of Watzlawick et al. f it is
discussed separately here.
Watzlawick and his colleagues describe the request for
noncompliant behavior as a "Be spontaneous" paradox. As
noted above, Watzlawick and his colleagues analyze the
request for spontaneous behavior as a request for
noncompliant behavior, thus concluding that such a request
is a self-reflexive negative statement. Regarding the
consequences of a request for noncompliant behavior, the
same reason i ng • repor ted above by Watzlawick and his
colleagues for the effects of the request for involuntary
behavior applies. In short, they see this type of request
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as highly problematical in ordinary relationships.
in contrast with the communication forms described
above, the request for noncompliant behavior is formally
paradoxical. The defining example is "Disobey me" which has
already been discussed. For requested behaviors like
independence and dominance, formal paradox occurs because
these injunctions are self-reflexive, they modify
themselves. Thus, when I tell you to be independent, your
compliance with this request qualifies as dependent
behavior—you're doing what I tell you— and refusal to
follow the request would have to be shown by continuing
dependence. In other words, an independent response is
dependent, but a dependent response is independent. The
same argument can be made for the "Dominate me" request. A
dominant response is submissive (the request is being
followed) and a submissive response is dominant (the request
is being defied).
Requests for noncompliant behavior may be considered
formally paradoxical, but this does not make them powerful
in ordinary relationships. Even such a clearly paradoxical
injunction as "Disobey me" may have a nonproblematic meaning
in social interaction. For example, if in the midst of an
argument over the use of the family car, a mother tells her
teen-aged daughter, "Go ahead, disobey me, take the car,"
the daughter probably knows her mother has reached a limit
of exaspe ration and that to drive away will not count as an
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act of obedience, but as an act of disobedience.
Hoffman's (1980, 1981) discussion of paradoxical
directives underlines and amplifies Rabkin's argument. She,
too, asserts that these injunctions signal a desire for
systems change and that they can be negotiated successfully.
When the systems change is disqualified, then a double bind
has occurred. Hoffman goes beyond Rabkin, however, in
suggesting that paradoxical injunctions are a necessary
ingredient of systems change. While Rabkin proposes that
these changes may derive from other sources, Hoffman sees
the paradoxical injunction as a key element in the pressures
she describes as the "sweat box" which precede change:
... a prerequisite for creative leaos in
complex systems is a period of of confusion
accompanied by self-contradictory messages,inconsistencies, and above all, paradoxicalinjunctions: I command you to be independent; Iwant you to spontaneously love me; I order you tobe the dominant one [1980, p. 64].
From a critical perspective, Hoffman's analysis suffers
from the same formal problems outlined in many cases above.
She draws a parallel between paradoxical communication and
logical paradox, but does not explain the meaning of this
connection. In her discussion, she does not refer to the
meaning reversals of logical paradox as an explanation of
why these injunctions are powerful, but significantly, she
maintains the view that the injunctions are powerful. Their
power has simply shifted from a necessary association with
pathological communication to a potential for both good and
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bad communication patterns. Essentially, then, Hoffman's
analysis still implies an assumption of formal determinism.
CHAPTER III
AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
PARADOXICAL COMMUNICATION
In Chapter II, it is argued that three distinct
communication forms are conceptualized as paradoxical in the
literature and that only one of these is formally
paradoxical. Further, a critique is presented of the
implicit and explicit assumption that communication forms
described as paradoxical determine human interaction through
the operation of formal influence. The specification of
distinct communication forms and the rejection of formal
daterminism in the paradoxical communication literature
raises two questions: first, what is the nature of the
communication forms previously described as paradoxical?
and, second, what is the relationship between these
communication forms and human interaction?
In this chapter these two questions are addressed
through an alternative model of paradoxical communication
based in Coordinated Management of Moaning (CMM) theory.
Essentially, it is argued that the communication forms
described as paradoxical in the literature may be
conceptualized as cultural level metarules. These highly
abstract rules represent a matrix of potential meanings
which are variously negotiated in social interaction. This
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chapter begins with a brief summary of CMM theory following
which the conceptualization of "paradoxical" co^un ica t ion
within this theory is developed. Finally, the three
communication forms described as paradoxical in the
Literature are discussed in light of this alternative
conceptual model.
The CMM Model of Human Communication
The CMM model of human communication (Cronen et al.,
1982; Cronen and Pearce, 1981; Pearce and Cronen, 1980) is
based on the assumption that meaning is created and
negotiated in a social context. This complex process is
described within the model in terms of three basic
constructs—hierarchical levels of meaning, rules, and
logical force—each of which is specified through the use of
algebraic expressions. Note that the description of the CMM
model which follows is simplified; the specific concepts
reviewed are those which are most relevant to the present
analysis of "paradoxical" communication.
Hierarchical levels of meaning
Social meaning is context dependent. An insult
delivered to a friend in a friendly exchange is interpreted
as kiddingwhile the same insult addressed to a foe in a
stand-off counts as an instigation to attack. Within the
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CMM «Odel, six different contextual levels of waning are
specified; any combination may be utilized in the
interpretation of social interaction.
At the lowest level of meaning, content (Cn) refers to
the basic data of communication before interpretation
occurs. For example, words, gestures, or acts, in
themselves, have no meaning. it is only within the context
of higher levels of meaning that content may be interpreted.
The speech act (Sp Act) level of meaning refers to the
relational interpretation of content in social interaction.
In one situation, a smile may count as a sexual invitation
while in another as a hostile expression of superiority.
The episodic (Ep) level of meaning represents the context of
a temporally bounded exchange of acts that persons view as
wholes. For example, in a typical greeting exchange,
asking, "How are you?" counts as a salutation rather than an
actual inquiry. This significance is generated by the type
of episode in which the greeting takes place. During a
hospital visit, the same question would be interoreted
differently. The rel ationship (R) level of meaning refers
to the set of mutual expectations social actors have about
what will transpire between them and what this will mean.
This context is a highly significant determinant of social
meaning. A compliment to one's spouse is understood very
differently from a compliment to one's boss. The 1 i f e-
script (L-S) level of meaning represents the individual's
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self-concept and again is an important context for social
waning. The teats of an aloof, reserved woman, for
example, mean something quite different from the tears of
»»« labile, expressive sister. Finally, c
_^^l oattetns
(CP) define a people's most fundamental assumptions about
ways of knowing and acting.
According to CMM theory, the six levels of meaning
defined above are hierarchically organized with each
succeeding level representing a higher order of meaning.
The relationship between levels is not, however, either
static or unidirectional. A higher level is created throug
time and then serves to define the lower level. And while
higher level of meaning exerts more influence over the
meaning of something at a lower level, it is also possible
and necessary for changes at a lower level to influence the
meaning of a higher level. Context refers to the power of
higher level of meaning to make sense of events at a lower
level
.
To illustrate the evolution of context within the CMM
model consider a developing close relationship. At first
particular episodes are highly significant in building
mutual expectations about the relationship. Positive
experiences, like having fun on a date, create sharer]
feelings of enjoyment. As the number of pleasurable
episodes increases, the relationship is defined as close.
Early in the relationship, a negative episode like arguing
78
over what to do for the evening may be highly disruptive as
the relationship definition is not yet consolidated. Later
on when the couple's relationship is clearly close and
positive, a single negative episode will have less influence
over the relationship definition. in fact, the relationship
will contaxtualize the negative episode which may be
interpreted as transitory and insignificant. if negative
episodes continue to occur, however, eventually the
relationship will be redefined by the episodes; the lower
meaning level will transform the higher one.
Within the CMM model, the relative influence of
contextual levels is expressed algebraically as shown in
Figure 2. Here the contextual relationship between two
levels is defined in terms of the relative impact of change
in each level. If 'a' is the context for 'b,' then a change
in 'a' is more likely to result in a change in 'b' than a
change in 'b 1 resulting in a change in 'a. 1 If 'b' is the
context for 'a,' then a change in 'b' is more likely to
result in a change in 'a' than the reverse. In addition to
showing the relative influence of change in each of two
contextual levels, Figure 2 presents a reflexive type of
contextual relationship in which contextual forces are
balanced such that it is equally Likely for one level of
meaning to be the context for the other as the reverse.
Within the CMM model, this type of contextual reflexivity is
understood as formally equivalent to paradox.
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a
i^O p Ab] > fob 3 p A a] Model 1
b
51
Where
:
E4a 0 p A b] < [4b 3 p A a]
[ A a ;) P A b] = [4 b D pA a
Model 2
Model 3
read as "in the context of ... » For
a
example b] should be read "b in the context
of a."
A = change
O = read "if
. . . than"
p = probability
> = greater than
< = less than
= = equal to
O = reflexive loop
Figure 2. Algebraic expressions of the three kinds of
relationships that can exist between two levels of meaningin a hierarchical system (from Cronen et al., 1982,
30
Rules
The CMM model proposes that patterns of human
interaction may be described in terms of rules persons have
for making sense of experience and Cor deciding how to act.
Constituti ve rules define how meaning is construed in the
context of the hierarchical levels of meaning described
above and regulative rules stipulate possible or necessary
ways of behaving.
In Figure 3 the algebraic expression of a constitutive
rule is presented. In the example provided the constitutiv
rule defines the meaning of Jeff's request: "Would you do
the dishes?" Depending on the context, the request could
mean many things. Here the situation is one in which Jeff
and Susan are involved in a love relationship and they are
having a fight. In this context, the antecedent message is
Susan's turning on the T.V. and Jeff's request counts as an
angry demand and as a refusal to end the argument. This
constitutive rule may be distinguished from a regulative
rule insofar as the focus is on the assignment of meaning,
i.e., what does Jeff's request signify? and not on the
determination of action, i.e., what should Jeff do now?
In Figure 4, the algebraic expression of a regulative
rule is presented. Two terms are added to this expression
compared with constitutive rules. Deontic operators
fer to how particular actions are implicated in
transaction. In context an act may be considered
as
re
81
Primitive form of a constituti ve rule
M
CR
k-n
where
:
cR
A
M,
Mk-n =
1
A 3 [Mi —^Mj]
constitutive rule
antecedent message or condition
meaning at some level of abstraction »i« « uchas content level of meaning
meaning at another level of abstraction "1"
such as command level or relational meaning
meanings at higher levels of abstraction such
•as the episode of talk or the definition of a
relationship
read "counts as"
read "in the context of
. .
.
»
read "if
. . . then"
Example
:
Love Relationship
Episode of Fighting
Susan turns ~\
on T.V.
Jeff: "Would you
do the dishes?"
Angry demand
and refusal
to end
argument
Figure 3. Constitutive rules (after Cronen et al., 1982,
Figure 3)
.
Primitive form of a regulative rule:
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rR
Actn 3-n
where
:
A
Do
Actn
1 - n
SpAct
C
Example
:
Love Relationship
[A D (Do (SpAct) ) Un ] 3) c
antecedent message or condition
deontic operator. The deontic operators areobligatory, legitimate, prohibited, and
undetermined
a class term for action at any level of themeaning above speech acts
speech acts
intended consquequents of speech acts
Episode of Fighting
Jeff makes an 3 (Oblig. express
angry demand anger: "Go
to hell!")
^ Jeff doesn't
win fight
Figure 4. Regulative rules (after Cronen et al., 1982
Figure 5)
.
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obligatory, legitimate, prohibited or undeterred. The
intended consequent refers to what outcome the person is
seeking. In the example given, the regulative rules tells
how Susan should act in order to bring about a particular
outcome. m the context of a love relationship during a
Eight, if Jeff makes an angry demand, Susan is obliged to
express anger in return ("Go to hell!") ln order to keep
Jeff from winning the fight.
A third type of rule referred to by CMM theorists is
the metarule defined as "a rule for the construction of
other rules" (Cronen et al., 1982, p. 103). while this type
of rule has not been formalized or elaborated within the CMM
model, it may be used to specify certain necessary
relationships among particular social meanings. m other
words, there appear to be some contextual relationships
among levels of meaning which either make sense or don't
make sense in general. And these general meaning patterns
are defined by metarules. The example of a metarule
presented by Cronen et al. (1982) involves the dynamics of a
developing relationship in which a "cooling-distancing"
episode has occurred. The impossibility of a "cooling-
distancing" episode being the context for a "committed-
close" relationship is defined by a metarule which would
apply to developing relationships in general. In this case,
the metarule defines the impossibility of a particular
episode being the context for a certain relationship. This
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impossibility is defined within a larger context of cultural
patterns and/or certain life meanings. The metarule may be
expressed algebraically as in Figure 5. The use of metarules
for describing cultural level relationships among social
meanings will be applied below in the section on alternative
conceptual models for "paradoxical" communication.
Logical force
Within the CMM model, the nature of the deontic
operation connecting acts within regulative rules is further
elaborated in the discussion of logical force. This concept
refers to actors' rules defining the push and pull of their
social actions. The experience of acting out of felt
necessity vis-a-vis a particular level of meaning is
referred to as pref igurat i ve force
. A person may feel
obligated to act in a certain manner because: "That's how
we've always done it" (cultural pattern); "Being married
means I have to do it" (life-script); "The situation called
for it" (episode); or "After what s/he said, I had to do it"
(speech act). For example, a man who sees himself as
nurturant may feel obligated to respond sympathetically to a
friend's distress. This response may be defined as
necessary both vis-a-vis the man's life-script and his
relationship with the friend.
In contrast with pref igurat i ve force, pract ica
1
force
refers to the degree to which a person acts in order to
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mR
cp y l - s
cooling-distancing
episode
close-committed
relationship
where
:
mR
y
metarule
read "and or"
negation
figure 5. Example of a metarule (after Cronen et al., 1982
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achieve some end vis-a-vis a particular level of meaning,
e.g., "To keep the tradition going" (cultural pattern, or
"To end the conversation amicably" (episode). The
sympathetic response in the example above may also be
determined by the man's desire to establish or maintain a
relationship definition «hich will accommodate his own
future needs.
Both prefigurative and practical forces operate in the
determination of social action. The balance of both types
of force is referred to as relative necessity
. When
prefigurative force is high relative to practical force, the
actor's experience is one of compulsion; when practical
force is high relative to prefigurative force, the actor's
experience is one of purposefulness.
An Alternative Conceptual Model of Paradoxical Communication
The forms of communication described as paradoxical in
the literature are best understood within the CMM system as
cultural level metarules. To elaborate, these forms
represent abstract rules for the construction of
constitutive and regulative rules in ongoing interaction.
They are based on shared cultural assumptions about the
nature of fundamental social reality. The foremost example
is formal paradox itself, a se 1 f- ref 1 ex i ve negative
statement which generates meaning reversals. If we ask, why
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do these meaning reversals occur, the answer must lie in
culturally agreed upon rules for the assignment of meaning
within an abstract system. Kt . very basic ^^
upon definitions of truth, falsehood, and reflexive
assertion such that the Epimenides paradox may be grasped by
any adequately intelligent member of our culture. it was
Russell and Whitehead's triumph to make explicit the
implicit rules which create this curious, to us, entailment
of contradiction in the liar paradox.
The meaning reversals entailed by the "Disobey me"
paradox and related requests for noncompliant behavior are
defined by cultural level metarules similar to those
defining formal paradox. Contradictory double-level
communication and the request for involuntary behavior are
two communication forms which have been shown not to be
formally paradoxical. While distinct from paradox, these
forms are also constituted at a cultural level. With
respect to contradictory double-level communication, we
agree fundamentally upon the nature of contextual hierarchy.
Given two contradictory messages, we agree that one shall
influence the interpretation of the other and that ambiguity
results from the lack of information about the relative
influence of the two messages. With respect to involuntary
behavior, we agree that compliant behavior must be voluntary
and that, therefore, involuntary behavior cannot be a
compliant response to a request.
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Cultural level metarules define the communication forms
described as paradoxical in the literature, but what is the
relationship between these rules and actual human
interaction? As we have seen, many theorists have assumed a
deterministic relationship between form and interaction.
Just as a rock thrown over a cliff must obey the law of
gravity, these theorists have argued that people must obey
the rules which define certain communication forms as
contradictory or paradoxical and suffer the pathogenic or
therapeutic consequences. Granted the inadequacy of this
approach, how are we to understand the function of rules
defining paradoxical communication when these rules are not
necessarily followed in human interaction? The answer is
that while these rules are clear when considered in an
abstract conceptual context, they represent only potential
and not necessary avenues for the interpretation of human
action. As we shall see, the rules defining the meaning of
contradictory double-level communication are commonly
utilized in the construction of social meaning while it
appears that the rules defining the request for involuntary
behavior as impossible and the request for noncomp I iant
behavior as paradoxical are less commonly invoked.
This conceptual model of communication described as
paradoxical emphasizes the importance of context in
understanding how those forms will be negotiated; i.e., the
crucial factors in understanding "paradoxical" communication
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lie in the episodic, relationship, and life-script levels of
meaning. TheS e separate contexts determine how
"paradoxical" forms of communication are invoked. m the
literature, the isolation and focus upon "paradoxical"
injunctions in themselves has tended to obscure the
importance of the underlying episodic, relationship, and
life-script issues.
in the following sections, formal paradox and each of
the communication forms described as paradoxical in the
literature are reviewed. Each form is specified within the
CMM model of algebraic expression and the inherent
implications of these forms for social meaning are
discussed. Some of the various ways these forms may be
negotiated in human interaction are also suggested through
reference to examples discussed in Chapter II and through
the presentation of new examples.
Formal paradox
As reviewed above, the C« M model defines formal paradox
in terms of a reflexive relationship between two levels of
meaning. This definition requires two additional features
in order to describe formal paradox as presented in Chapter
II: first, the reflexive relationship between levels must
be self-reflexive, i.e., one message forms its own context;
and second, the message must be negative. Utilizing the CMM
notation system, a paradoxical form of reflexive loop may be
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specified as shown in Fiqur^ 6 HorQ 1c g e b. e e the negative message,
"I am lying/' reflexively forms its own C0nt9xt> I( . . g g
statement itself, yet at the same time a statement about
itself. m cases where this formal relationship occurs, the
attempt to assign meaning leads one through a vicious-circle
of meaning reversals: "if i am lying
, then , am ^
truth and if I am telling the truth, I am lying."
Contradictory doub le-level communication
Contradictory double-level communication represents a
form in which contradictory messages are delivered at
different levels of meaning. The rule for defining the
resultant meaning of this type of communication is that one
of the contradictory messages forms the context for the
other, thus influencing the interpretation of that message.
The CMM model presents contradictory double-level '
communication in terms of the hierarchical contextua 1 ization
of communication. In fact, the power of context in
determining meaning is often presented by CM M theorists with
an example of contradictory double-level communication. One
example they use is the street game, "Playing the Dozens,"
in which insults are interpreted in terms of gamesmanship
rather than hostility.
While the CMM model provides implicit recognition of
contradictory double-level communication, the potential of
this form for meaning reversals is only emphasized with
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O
where
:
p
M
P:M M^i 3 Mi and
Mi D M ;
1 /V/ J.
paradoxical reflexive loop
negation
message
Example of a paradoxical reflexive loop:
QP: I am lying. I am
lying. 3 I am tellingthe truth.
and
I am telling
-n i am lyinq.
the truth. -J
Figure 6. Metarule for a paradoxical reflexive loop.
eve
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respect to the strange loop in which the contextual
relationship between con trad 1C tory usages is unclear. Th
OHM definition of contextual relationsh lp is one of relati
influence of incremental change in different levels of
waning. if a change
, £or exampl^ at ^ ^^
is more likely to change the meaning of the episodic level
than the reverse, the CMM model defines the speech act level
as the context for the episode. This model serves well for
the description of the evolution of context through
interaction, but does not explicitly distinguish the
reversals which may occur in contradictory double-level
communication.
An additional expression for the definition of
contradictory double-level communication is presented in
Figure 7. It is intended to supplement the CMM model of the
three potential relationships between levels of meaning
presented earlier in Figure 2. Hera, the reversal of
context between 'a' and 'b' represents an exclusive
disjunction, i.e., mutually exclusive interpretations occur
depending on which message is context for the other. In the
example given, the contradictory messages are friendliness
as expressed through smiles and a light hone and hostility
as expressed through the massage: "You're so stupid." When
friendliness forms the context for the hostile message, the
communication may be interpreted as kidding, but when the
message is the context for the friendliness, the
93
i Ho"
ro|XI
e
o
0
c
3
r—i
CO
•rH
T3
CD
>
rH
CO
a
H
U
X
cd
c
o
•rH
4J
o
(13
M
4J
CO
XI
ia
o
w
rH
CD
>
cd
o
5
4J
4->
CO
TJ
CD
M
CD
>
CD
T3
C
o
•H
4J
co
u
•t-t
c
3
O
o
>
CD
rH
I
cd
3
O
T3
>i
U
o
4J
o
•<-t
T3
CO
M
4->
C
o
u
M
o
OS
e
CD
M
CD
x:
3
(fl Mh
CD
tT> CD
(0 rH
CO a
If]
CD co
E 4J
CD
>i £
M
O 14-1
4-> o
u
•iH c
13 o
CO rH
rH 4->
-P (0
C u
o •rH
0 r-l
a
a
II
CO
o
f
XI CD
!—
1
T5 a
C E
CO (0
X
(0 U
O o
•i-t (0
u u
4J
> <
/
o Cn
CO c
•iH
CD i—
1
M •iH
E CD3 w c
O oX •• 4J
10
CO 4-1
CD JC
>1 • c cn
4J
"H -ri
•iH rH rH rH
rH a
iH 3 C T3
4-1 4J CD C
CO CO •M (0
O M
HI
CP
C
•rH
T3
TJ
-rH
r
Cn O
C CO
•rH
rH CD
•rH M
E CD
w c 3
o O
•• 4-1
CO
CO 4-1
CD rC • •
C Cn >i •
•|H -rH 4-'
rH i—
1
•rH •rH
TJ rH
C TD •rH a
CD C 4J 4J
•rH (0 CO CO
M o
Pu
c
o
ra
o
•rH
c
3
E
E
O
O
CD
>
CD
rH
I
CD
rH
rQ
3
O
TJ
>1
M
O
4J
o
•r-l
<0
u
4-)
c
o
u
u
o
4-1
CD
rH
3
rH
CO
4-1
CD
t>
CD
M
3
Cn
•rH
94
communication may be interpreted as something completely
different, i.e., as a vicious attack. This example
illustrates the crucial nature of the contextual
relationship between contradictory messages in the
interpretation of communication.
As discussed in Chapter II, the contradictory double-
level communication form may be negotiated in a variety of
ways. The "paradoxes of abstraction" conceptualized by
Bateson, Haley, and Fry refer to situations in which the
contextual relationship between contradictory messages is
clear, although subject to reversals. In the Figure 7
example, the establishment of the contextual hierarchy
yields a stable meaning, but a reversal of the hierarchy may
occur. This is similar to Bateson's (1972) example of a
peace-making ceremony in the Andaman Islands in which ritual
blows are exchanged. The danger exists that the blows will
become context for the ceremony, a meaning reversal will
occur, and that fighting will break out all over again.
The strange loop, of course, refers to contradictory
doub le- level communication in which the contextual
relationship between messages is perfectly balanced such
that it is equally likely for one message to be the context
as the reverse. Imagine the difficulty which might occur in
the Figure 7 example if the hostile message were equally
likely to be the context for the friendly smiles and tone as
the reverse. The resulting ambiguity would entail confusion
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about completely opposite interpretations of the
communication and the proper response.
The double bind is a type of contradictory double-level
communication in which the potential for meaning reversals
is exploited to frustrate or reward the respondent. As
discussed in Chapter II, this reversal is pragmatically ind
not formally determined. Using the Figure 7 example once
more, a double bind would be created if the person
delivering the communication refused to acknowledge any
interpretation suggested by the respondent. if the
respondent takes the message as kidding, i.e., accepts the
friendly tone and smiling as a context for the hostile
message, the speaker would disqualify this, possibly saying,
"You're so stupid, you take everything as a joke." If,
however, the respondent takes the message seriously, i.e.,
accepts the hostile message as context for the friendLy tone
and smiling, and defends him/herself, the speaker will also
disqualify this interpretation, saying, for example, "You
always take things too seriously. I was just joking." The
respondent can never be correct and the potential pathogenic
quality of the interaction is revealed.
The request for involuntary behavior
Within the CM M model, the request for involuntary
behavior may be described in terms of a metarule for the
disjunction between involuntary and compliant responses,
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i.e., a compliant response does not count as an involuntary
response and an involuntary response does not count as a
compliant response (see Figure 8). m the example given,
Susan's request, "Be more affectionate/' is an injunction
for a certain type of feeling from Jeff and a feeling
represents an involuntary response. The metarule defines a
compliant response with this request as purposeful and
therefore not involuntary behavior. If Susan invokes this
metarule, she may disqualify Jeff's saying, »I love you," as
compliant and not involuntary, i.e., not coming from true
feeling. Although it is difficult to imagine the
possibility, if Jeff were somehow to convey that he was
saying, "I love you," only out of feeling and without regard
to Susan's request, she could disqualify this response for
not being compliant, i.e., he has not followed her request.
As described in Chapter II, this rule is negotiated in
a variety of ways in human interaction. Haley's discussion
of hypnosis provides an example of a situation in which the
subject is moved to respond in a particular way and
simultaneously to deny that the response is voluntary. The
relationship is defined as one in which the hypnotist is in
charge of this very loss of volition. In therapy, as we
have seen, the request for involuntary behavior has been
used to facilitate emotional expressiveness in a manner
similar to hypnosis. Such requests have also been exploited
in the technique of symptom prescription, with the intention
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mR =
CP y/ L.S. y/ R
EPi
A [jCn j -» S PAct k ] £ [Cnj ^spActil]
where
:
A
Cn •
SpAct k
SpAc^
CP
L.S.
R
request episode
involuntary behavior request
response following request
compl iance
involuntary
cultural patterns
life-script
.
relationship
Example of application of metarule for the request forinvoluntary behavior: c t
Cultural Patterns of Western Civilization
Life-script of Wary Lover
Relationship Shaky
Episode of Request for Affection
S says:
"Be more
af fect iona te ! 11
2 J's response:
"I love you."
J's response:
"I love you."
compl iant
i nvolun tary
Figure 8. Metarule for the request for involuntary behavior.
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of interrupting systematic behavior. Note that within the
therapeutic relationship, this for, of request is negotiated
very differently.
in ordinary relationships, requests for involuntary
behavior have been described as necessarily frustrating, but
this need not be the case. if a msn is requested by his
wife, for example, to enjoy playing with his kids
(Watzlawick et al., 1967), he may consciously remind himself
that his children will be grown soon and that it is a
pleasure to see them respond to his interest. if he then
arranges to play touch football with his kids in the
backyard, his voluntary thoughts and actions may result in a
passively experienced sense of enjoyment. Now, when his
wife looks out the window and sees her husband beaming while
watching his youngster try for a pass, she can be pleased
that her husband has complied with her request. Note that
the wife evaluates her husband's behavior as simultaneously
compliant— he is doing what she has asked—and involuntary--
he is passively experiencing and manifesting a sense of
en j oymen t
.
This does not mean that the formal nature of the
request may not be exploited in a problematic fashion. In
the example above, the wife may remain dissatisfied, telling
herself that her husband is only playing with the kids
because she asked him to and that he doesn't really enjoy
it. Note that it is the way the husband and wife negotiate
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this revest that creates problems
, not the formal natuce Qf
the request itself.
The request for noncom£] iant behavior
As mentioned above, the metarule for defining
noncompliant behavior requests is similar to that defining
formal paradox. In this case, it is the response to the
request rather than the assignment of meaning to the
paradoxical statement which is involved in vicious-circle
Mailing reversals (see Figure 9). Here the metarule defines
the effort to comply with the noncompliant behavior request
as a defiant response because the request is for
noncompliance. However, the effort to defy the response is
defined as compliant since, again, the request is for
noncompliance. In the Figure 9 example, the noncompliant
behavior request is the husband's demand that his wife "be
independent." If she attempts to comply with this request
by being independent, her husband may invoke the metarule
for noncompliant behavior requests and disqualify her
response for being compliant, she's showing her dependence
by following his orders. If, on the other hand, she defies
his demand and continues to be dependent, the invocation of
the metarule would suggest she has complied with his request
by being defiant. So, if the wife is independent, she's
dependent and if she's dependent, she's independent.
The apparent implication of this communication form for
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mR = EPi
A ^> SpActj Z> SpAct k and
SpAct k 3 SpActj
where
:
request episode
A request for noncompliant behavi
SpActj = compliant response
SpAct k = noncompliant response
CP cultural patterns
L-S li fe-scr ipt
R relationship
reques^sf
application of metarule for noncompliant behavi
Western Civilization (CP)
Dominant Husband (L-S
)
Troubled Marriage (R)
Request for Independence (Ep)
Compliance Defiance of
with request, D request, wife
getting a job still follow-
ing orders
and is
dependent
.
and
Defiance of Compliance
request, wife ^ with request,
refuses to wife shows
get a job independence
Husband says:
"Don't be so
dependent on
me. Go out
and get a
job. "
Figure 9. Metarule for noncompliant behavior requests.
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interaction is that the participants would get dizzy ln
their attempts to negotiate the request. The formal logic
of the request is like a revolving door in which there is no
stopping and from which there is no exit. The respondent to
the request enters the door and keeps moving, but being
inside the building only implies a return to the outside of
the building. it is an empirical question whether the
paradoxical logic of the form is actually ever followed in
real human interaction.
Another implication of the form (and one that seems
more plausible for real human interaction) is that the
requester either qualifies any response as defiant or
compliant. The husband in the example provided in Figure 9
may reject his wife's efforts to comply with his request by
getting a job. He may say, "You're just doing what I tell
you to do. Why can't you be more independent?" On the
other hand, her refusal to follow his request by not getting
a job may also be rejected: "I told you to be more
independent. Can't you go out and get a job?" This is the
type of interaction which has typically been associated with
noncompliant behavior requests in the literature.
The formal logic of the request for noncompliant
behavior may also be exploited to qualify any response to
the request as compliant. For example, a father may toll
his son to bo more independent by finding his own friends.
If the son then takes the initiative in getting to know a
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neighbor's child, the father may be pleased. If, on the
other hand, the child does not look for his own friends, the
father could also be pleased, remarking, "You've got a mlnd
of your own and you're not going to run out and do just as I
say . "
In actual human interaction, of course, the paradoxical
logic of the request for noncompliant behavior may be
ignored altogether. As discussed in Chapter II, even such a
clearly paradoxical injunction as "Disobey me" may be
negotiated in complete disregard for the logic of the
command. Further, a request for independent behavior may be
treated in the same way as a request for ordinary compliant
behavior like "Pass the salt." If the independent response
is observed, the recipient of the request is considered
compliant and if the independent response is not observed,
the recipient of the request is considered defiant.
CHAPTER iv
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INVOLUNTARY BEHAVIOR
REQUESTS AND NONCOMPL I ANT BEHAVIOR REQUESTS
Purpose of Study
It has been argued that a key focus in the
understanding of communication described as paradoxical is
that the vicious-circle reasoning that is associated with
logical paradox drives actual social interaction in
particular ways. An exploratory empirical study utilizing
an interview strategy was carried out to investigate how, in
fact, injunctions described as paradoxical are negotiated in
ordinary social relationships. The decision was made to
study involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant
behavior requests because both forms have been consistently
described as paradoxical in the literature and as single-
statement injunctions, they lend themselves to
identification and description. Contradictory double-level
communication was not investigated because it has not been
consistently described as paradoxical in the literature and
because it would appear to be much more difficult to specify
in actual relationships.
Because most of the empirical data on involuntary
behavior requests and noncompliant behavior requests are
10 3
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either anecdotal or clinical in nature, one of the major
goals of this study was descriptive. How, when and with
whom do individuals make such requests? How are these
requests interpreted by the participants in the interaction
and how do individuals respond to these requests? How is
the response following the request interpreted and how does
this contribute to the satisfying or unsatisfying
negotiation of the exchange?
A more particular exploratory objective of the present
study was to investigate whether the formal differences in
involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior
requests are associated with differences in interaction. On
the one hand, the literature has emphasized the pernicious
effects of paradox itself in ordinary social transactions
and one might expect the formally paradoxical noncompliant
behavior request to be more problematic than the formally
absurd involuntary behavior request. On the other hand, the
two request types are similar in that it is the effort to
fulfill the request which is interpreted as evidence that
the request has not been met. In the request for
involuntary behavior request, an attempt to comply with the
request is considered voluntary and so the request for
inv oluntary behavior is unfulfilled. In the request for
noncompliant behavior, a compliant response is considered
noncompliant and vice versa. Because the form of both
request types hinges on a similar disqualification of the
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effort to comply with the request, one might expect closely
related issues arising in transactions involving these
-quests. Due to the lac, of any particular expectation
with regard to differences in the negotiation of involuntary
behavior requests and noncompliant behavior requests, no
specific research questions on this topic were formulated.
In addition to the need for basic descriptive
information on involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests, the conceptual arguments
proposed above regarding the negotiation of these requests
in ordinary social interactions suggested two specific
research questions for investigation. m the literature on
paradoxical communication, both involuntary behavior
requests and noncompliant behavior requests have been
conceptualized as necessarily generating interpersonal
difficulties based on the formal characteristics of the
requests.. It has been argued here that this assumption of
formal determinism is inconsistent with the context
dependent nature of human communication and that satisfying
outcomes of involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant
behavior requests may be negotiated in social interaction.
Thus, one research question for this study was existential
in nature, i.e., do satisfying outcomes to involuntary
behavior requests and noncompliant behavior requests exist?
A more specific hypothesis for the present study was
also supported by the conceptual analysis provided above.
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This relates to the problem of how a compliant response to
an involuntary behavior request or a noncompliant behavior
request is perceived. in prior conceptualizations of
communication described as paradoxical, a compliant response
to an involuntary behavior request or a noncompliant
behavior request has been considered necessarily
unsuccessful as a fulfillment of the request. It has been
argued here that the interpretation of compliance in the
response to an involuntary behavior request or a
noncompliant behavior request may be the basis for
dissatisfaction with the response for not being involuntary
or not being compliant. On the other hand, the simultaneous
evaluation of the response to an involuntary behavior
request or a noncompliant behavior request as both compliant
and involuntary or both compliant and noncompliant according
to the terms of the request may be the basis for
satisfaction with the response as a successful fulfillment
of the request. This line of reasoning supported the
following hypothesis, given here separately for involuntary
and noncompliant behavior for the sake of clarity:
When the response to a request for involuntary
behavior is seen as compliant, then satisfaction
with the response is related to whether the
response is also seen as involuntary.
When the response to a request for noncompliant
behavior is seen as compliant, then satisfaction
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with the response is related to whether the
response is also seen as noncompl iant.
Note that this hypothesis only addresses responses to
involuntary behavior requests or noncompliant behavior
requests which are seen as compliant.
Des ign
Essentially the study involved asking subjects to
describe experiences surrounding involuntary behavior
requests and noncompliant behavior requests in their close
relationships. The interview outline was guided by the CMM
model of human communication presented earlier. This model
was chosen because it has been used successfully in the
investigation of complex social episodes including weeping
(Cornelius, 1981), undesired repetitive patterns (Cronen,
Pearce, and Snavely, 1979), and, most notably, paradoxical
communication (Harris, 1980; Harris, Cronen, and McNamee,
Note 3). These studies all utilized structured interviews
with subjects on the social interactions being studied and
the same basic approach was used in the present study. The
results of a pilot study showed that subjects can recollect
experiences with involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests and that they can
meaningfully describe these experiences.
In the study, subjects were asked to describe an
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involuntary behavior request or a noncompliant behavior
request which they had delivered rather than received. Thi
decision was made to simplify the study and because one
basic research question was whether people can be satisfied
with the response following an involuntary behavior request
or a noncompliant behavior request. It was felt that this
question would be most appropriately evaluated based on the
requester's interpretation of the response rather than the
respondent
' s
.
At the outset of the interview subjects were asked to
identify either an involuntary behavior request or a
noncompliant behavior request which they had made in the
context of a close relationship. They were asked to
describe the relationship in which the request occurred and
to outline the frequency and timing of their request and
responses following the request. When subjects recalled
making the request more than once, they described the
request episode which was most clear for them. When they
recalled more than one response following the request, they
described two response episodes--one which was less or leas
satisfying and one which was more or most satisfying. This
allowed for the exploration of the determinants of the
successful and unsuccessful negotiation of such requests.
Descriptive data on subjects' experiences with
involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior
requests were sought through a variety of open-ended and
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quantitative measures derived primarily from the CMM m0del.
The research questions posed above were addressed through
more specific measures designed to assess satisfaction with
the response following the request, the compliant nature of
the response, and the involuntary or noncompliant nature of
the response.
Subjects
For two basic reasons, only female subjects were used
in the study. First, anecdotal and pilot study data
suggested that women may be more capable of reporting on
experiences with involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests. Since this was an
exploratory investigation, it was reasonable to use the
subjects who are the best informants, in this case, women.
Second, the hypotheses of the present study focussed on the
formal aspects of involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests. Sex differences in the
delivery of the requests and their negotiation from the
requester's point of view were not of interest. The
descriptive objectives and the evaluation of the research
questions were adequately explored with female subjects
only
.
Subjects were University of Massachusetts
undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses. They
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received a small amount of experimental credit towards
psychology class grades for their participation in the
study. Recruitment information delivered both in psychology
courses and through a posted sign-up sheet was as follows:
Female subjects are being sought for a study of
two particular kinds of requests made in the
context of a close relationship (e.g., with a
boyfriend, husband, mother, father, brother,
sister, friend, or child). If you can clearly
recall making either one of the requests
described below in the context of a close
relationship, you are eligible for participation
in this study. The study will involve a detailed
interview about your experience with the request
which will last about one-and-a-half hours. You
will receive two experimental credits for your
participation
.
Request I : This type of request is for behavior
which is experienced passively, that is, behavior
which cannot be produced on purpose like
emotions, desires, and spontaneity. Examples of
these requests are:
L. You should enjoy studying.
2. I want you to want to spend time with
me
.
3. Bring me flowers spontaneously.
Request II : This type of request is for behavior
Ill
which is noncompliant, that is, behavior which is
independent, dominant, or disobedient. Examples
of these requests are:
1. You should be more independent.
2. I want you to dominate me.
3. Don't do what I tell you to, decide foryourself.
Note that the request for a spontaneous gift of flowers was
dropped from the list of involuntary behavior requests
midway through the study when it was determined that this
request usually represents a noncompliant behavior request.
Fifty-seven subjects attended study sessions; forty
interviews were completed and judged appropriate for the
study. Twenty subjects reported on involuntary behavior
requests and twenty subjects reported on noncompliant
behavior requests.
Materials and Procedures
Elici tation
Following the review and signing of an informed consent
form, subjects were reminded of the types of requests under
investigation. Discussion then followed to identify an
appropriate request which the subject had delivered in the
context of a close relationship. In order to be acceptable,
the subject's recollection of both a request episode and a
response episode needed to be clear.
112
Descriptive measure
Descriptions of transactions surrounding the requests
were developed on the basis of the CMM model. Specifically,
information was sought regarding: (l) the duration and
frequency of the request and responses following the
request; (2) content and speech act meanings; (3) the
episodic variables of valence, coherence, and control; and
(4) life-script and relationship meanings especially in the
context of reflexive needs and reflexive effects. These
variables are explained below and the particular questions
used to address them are presented. Note that each
interview item was presented orally to the subject; when
scale ratings were made, subjects viewed a copy of the scale
and reported their rating verbally.
In addition to the quantitative items administered,
subjects were asked to describe in their own words how they
understood their interactions with the respondent to their
request. Two questions were explored after the subject
outlined the request episode or the response episode, but
before any specific questions concerning the episode were
asked: (1) How did you understand what was happening in
this episode? (2) How did [the respondent] understand what
was happening in this episode? Furthermore, the subject was
asked to briefly explain her quantitative ratings both to
insure the subject's understanding of the item and to help
explore the subject's perceptions of the questions raised by
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these items.
A copy of the interview schedule ,.b n i containing all the
items and scales administered is located in Appendix A. m
order to facilitate the recollection of material by the
subject, the order of questioning was somewhat different
from the order in which the items are discussed below.
Duration and f regnencZ_oJ_the_ request and responses
lollowin^^^ Although the focus of the study was
on the negotiation of a specific request, pilot and
anecdotal data suggested that involuntary behavior requests
and noncompliant behavior requests are often repeated over
time. As background information on the history of the
requests in the relationship, it was important to explore
the length of time during which the request was in effect
and the frequency with which the request was made.
In addition to the duration and frequency of the
request, the duration and frequency of responses following
the request were assessed. Note that in the assessment of
the duration and frequency of responses, the subject was
asked first to describe occurrences of the respondent's
behavior which were relevant to the request, but were not
necessarily efforts to fulfill the request. For example, if
the subject asked that the respondent be more independent,
she was
-asked how many times the respondent "showed you that
s/he was independent?" After gathering information on
responses in this way, subjects were asked if these
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responses occurred because of their request. Then subjects
were asked if the respondent made any other "specific
efforts to fulfill your request." The goal here was to
identify all the behaviors following the request which were
relevant to the request and not merely those responses which
were considered compliant efforts to respond to the request.
Content and speech act meaning. The description of
response and request episodes was developed in terms of the
sequence of acts performed. Subjects were encouraged to
describe as clearly as possible exactly what was said and
done by both participants in the episode. After the
delineation of acts, i.e., the episodic content, was
determined, subjects were asked how they understood the
episode and how they felt the respondent understood the
episode. Then the episodes were reviewed again, this time
with the goal of having the subject provide a speech act
label for each act which would describe what each
participant was attempting to do. The examples of speech
act labels used to facilitate this process were: insult,
plea for help, and information seeking.
Episodic variables of valence, coherence, and control
.
These terms are used in the CMM model to describe
respectively the participants' valuation of the episode, the
degree of mutual understanding in an episode and the
distribution of power in the episode. Given that requests
for involuntary behavior and requests for noncompl iant
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Savior have been portcayed as negauvej ^^^^^ ^
powerful in the literatuce
, it was ^ Qbtain
»*.-.tlM on these three dimensions in the present study
With respect to the valence of the episode, pilot
research suggested that at ti.es involuntary behavior
requests and noncompliant behavior reguest may lead to the
discussion and resolution of a relationship issue, when
this happens, the valence of the episode changes over its
duration. Since this was useful descriptive information to
obtain, subjects were asked to make a valence rating of
request episodes up to and including the reguest and at the
end of the episode. Valence was considered in terms of the
subjective emotional experience during the episode; at the
end of the episode, subjects were asked to rate the valence
of the episode in terms of their immediate subjective
emotional experience and in terms of the valence of the
episode vis-a-vis its long-term consequences for the
relationship with the other person. Valence in the response
episodes was rated for the episode as a whole and in terms
of the long-term consequences for the relationship. Ratings
of episode valence were performed on a 9 point scale li-
very negative, 9--very positive).
The level of coherence in the episode from the
subject's perspective was assessed through use of the
question: "How clearly did you and the other person
understand each other in this episode?" Ratings were made
116
on a 9 point scale (1-we understood each other very well,
9-we understood each other very poorly). Control in tJ
episodes was explored through use of the quests: "who had
more control over what happened in this episode?" Three
possible choices were provided for the subject's evaluation:
I had more control; the other person had more control;
neither I nor the other person had more control.
Life-script and_re l at ionship l e vels of meaning . Basic
demographic information regarding the life-script level of
meaning, i.e., age, sex and grade level or occupation, was
obtained for both subject and respondent. Background
information on the relationship within which the subject
described the request was obtained in terms of the nature
and duration of the relationship as well as changes which
had occurred in the relationship.
Two other CMM variables, reflexive needs and reflexive
effects, were assessed to help explore the life-script and
relationship levels of meaning. Reflexive need refers to
the necessity experienced by an individual to receive a
certain response from another individual in order to
maintain a desired contextual definition. For example, if
two professors are having a spirited discussion of social
science methodology, one may need to hear his or her
position acknowledged in order to maintain a definition of
the episodic context as a "spirited discussion" and not a
"futile argument." Reflexive effect refers to the actual
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change in contextual d ef inition which occurs ^
other-, response. m the example above, if tne second
professor does not offer acknowledgement of the first
Professor's position, the revive effect is a change in
the waning of the episodic context for the first professor
from "spirited discussion" to "futile argument."
in this study, reflexive needs and reflexive effects
were assessed in terms of the life-script and reiationship
levels of meaning. FoUowing their descriptions and ratings
of request episodes, subjects were asked first to explain
what response to the request was desired. This meaning was
then used to assess the reflexive need for this outcome in
terms of the life-script ("How would the desired response to
your request have affected your thoughts and feelings about
yourself?") and the relationship ("How would the desired
response to your request have affected your relationship
with the other person?"). immediately following each of
these questions, a rating of reflexive need strength was
obtained for the life-script level of meaning ("How much did
you need the desired response to your request in order to
achieve these thoughts and feelings about yourself?") and
the relationship level of meaning ("How much did you need
the desired response to your request in order to achieve
this effect in your relationship with the other person?").
Ratings of reflexive need strength were made on a 9 point
scale (1— I needed it very little, 9--I needed it very
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much). one additional item intended to increase the
understanding of the relationship level of meaning was
administered after the reflexive need questions: "At the
time of this episode, what changes, if any, did you desire
in your relationship with the other person?"
Reflexive effects were explored with respect to
response episodes. Following the description of the
response episode in terms of content and episodic variables,
subjects were asked to explain the fact of the other
person's response in terms of the life-script level of
meaning ("How did the response following your request affect
your thoughts and feelings about yourself?") and the
relationship level of meaning ("How did the response
following your request affect your relationship with the
other person?").
Research questions -
As outlined above, there were two specific research
questions for this study. The first involved the existence
of satisfying outcomes to involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests. To evaluate this question,
for each response episode described, the subject was asked,
"How satisfied did you feel with the other person's response
in this episode?" Ratings were performed on a 9 point scale
(Incompletely satisfied, 9--complete 1 y dissatisfied).
The second research question was expressed in terms of
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a conditional hyoothesis-
inmmm^"
When the response to a r^one^t- f«r
response is also seen as noncompl iant!
in order to evaluate this hypothesis, an assessment was
needed of three d imens ions-whether the response was perceiv
as an effort to comply with the request, how satisfied the
subject was with the response and the degree to which the
response was perceived as involuntary or noncompliant
according to the nature of the request. The satisfaction
item has just been described. The degree to which the
response was seen as compliant was assessed through asking
how strongly the subject agreed or disagreed with the
statement": "The other person acted as s/he did because I
asked him/her to do it." Assessment of the degree to which
the subject saw the response as involuntary or noncompliant
was made through asking how strongly the subject agreed or
disagreed with the statement: "The other person acted as
s/he did because s/he
. . . (the involuntary or noncompliant
aspect of the requested behavior was inserted here, e.g., if
the request was for spontaneity, ».
. . because s/he was
being spontaneous' or if the request was for independence,
'.
. .
because s/he was being independent')." Ratings foe
both compliance and the involuntary or noncompliant nature
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of the response were made on a 9 point scale ,l~strong ly
agree, 9--strongly disagree).
CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Overview
in this chapter the study results are presented and
discussed in three sections. First, a basic introduction to
the data is provided through discussion of the elicitation
process, the content categories of the requests, identifying
demographic and relationship information for the subjects,
and the duration and frequency of the requests and responses
following the request. This introductory section is
intended to orient the reader to the data as well as to
provide basic descriptive information on involuntary
behavior request and noncompliant behavior requests.
In the second section, the research questions are
reviewed via reference to the quantitative data.
Comparisons between the involuntary behavior request group
and the noncompliant behavior request group are presented;
the question of whether satisfactory outcomes can be
associated with these request types is discussed; and the
correlation between satisfaction with a response following a
request and the perception of the involuntary or
noncompliant nature of the response is discussed for cases
in which the subject felt the response occurred because of
the request.
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The third section represent-* = „esents a conceptual effort to
™-.t.t«- the inherent significance Qf lnvQluntacy
-quests and noncompliant behavi„ r requests and the
a,t,r"iD"nt
'
° f
—essful ana unsuccessful interactions
surrounding such requests. It is argued that the metarules
defining the contradictory or paradoxical nature or the
requests underline the ia«n== „issues of closeness and control in
human relationships. Further, it is proposed that the
essential determinants of how an involuntary behavior
request or a noncompliant behavior request is negotiated lie
in these issues of control and closeness. In the third
section the data are used in a qualitative fashion to
illustrate the argument presented.
Introduction to the Data
Elicitation
Three aspects of the elicitation process are discussed
in this section: (1) the reasons for interview failures;
(2) subjects' differential responses to elicitation for
involuntary behavior requests and elicitation for
noncompliant behavior requests; and (3) subjects'
spontaneous comments on problems with the type of request
under investigation.
Interview failures. Of the 57 subjects who attended
sessions, 40 interviews (70.2%) were completed and judged
the
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appropriate for analysis. There are several reasons for
remaining 17 interview failures (29.8%). In six caseS/
subjects were unable to recall making either an involuntary
behavior request or a noncompliant behavior request, i.e.,
"elicitation failure" occurred. m the remainder of cases
one or more of the following factors played a role in the
interview failure. Some subjects recalled appropriate
requests, but not in sufficient detail for the study. m
some cases an investigator error occurred—either an
appropriate request was mistakenly rejected from
consideration or elicitation instructions for a noncompliant
behavior request were not administered. The latter error
occurred because at a certain stage in the study, a
sufficient number of interviews an' noncompliant behavior
requests had been collected. At this point several subjects
reported noncompliant behavior requests but these were not
pursued because sufficient data on this request type had
been gathered. Finally, two subjects were interviewed about
requests which are later decided to be inappropriate for the
s t udy
.
Discussion
.
The most significant aspect of the
interview failures is that only 6 out of 57 subjects (10.5%)
were definitely unable to give an example of either an
involuntary behavior request or a noncompliant behavior
request. This may have been due to a self-selection
process. It will be recalled that the recruitment
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infection listed several examp les of the guests under
investigation and it may be that potential subjects who d4d
not identify with these examples may have decided not to
Participate. On the other hand, the relatively low failure
rate in this normal sample suggests that these types of
requests may be more common than previously thought.
Elicitatio n differences
. During the first 29
interviews when elicitation instructions were given for both
involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior
requests, subjects were much more likely to give an example
of a noncompliant behavior request. Seventeen subjects
(58.6%) reported noncompliant behavior requests, 7 subjects
(24.1%) reported involuntary behavior requests, and 5
subjects (17.2)% were interview failures. Because of thi
imbalance, the second 23 interviews began with elicitati*
instructions for involuntary behavior requests only, with
this procedural shift, the elicitation failure rate was
roughly equalized for involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests. Eleven out of 28 (39.3%)
elicitations for involuntary behavior requests failed and 6
out of 13 (46.2%) elicitations for noncompliant behavior
requests failed.
Discussion
.
The greater number of noncompliant
behavior requests reported during the first 29 interviews
may be due to two factors: (1) the elicitation instructions
for noncompliant behavior request were delivered second so a
s
.on
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recency effect »ay have resulted; (2) two request typeS/ ^
independent/' and, "Do something spontaneously," were
classified as noncompliant behavior requests and these
requests seemed more familiar to subjects than involuntary
behavior requests such as, "You should enjoy doing
something," or, "I want you to want to do something." The
observation of an equalization in elicitation failure rates
for involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior
requests over the second 28 interviews, however, suggests
that when subjects were actively encouraged to recall
involuntary behavior requests, this was no more unlikely
than the recall of noncompliant behavior requests. The net
impression gained is that certain noncompliant behavior
requests were relatively more salient in subjects'
experiences than involuntary behavior requests, but that
with increased facilitation, real elicitation differences
between the two request types were negligible.
Subjects' spontaneous reser v ations
. During the
elicitation process, spontaneous comments were made by seven
subjects (12.3%) which referred to the potentially
problematic nature of the requests presented. One subject
was particularly self-conscious about her decision not to
make involuntary behavior request or noncompliant behavior
requests: "All those things run through my mind, but I
never asked it, because if you asked them, it wouldn't be
spontaneous." Another subject recognized the requests as
126M on ,JtMlll fro™ one of her courses and
she asserted,
"it kind of loses ih,ts value when you have to
ask for something you want " Thoa=y . ese comments and those made
by the other five subjects are presented in Table 1.
Ri-ussion. The spontaneous comments of a number of
subjects on the potentially problematic nature of
involuntary behavior requests and nonco.pliant behavior
requests suggests that for certain individuals the issues
raised by these request are highly salient
. These
will be further discussed in the third section of this
chapter. At present it is interesting to note that it was
the exception rather than the rule for subjects to
articulate doubts about the desi rah; 1 ; v„ ,uts o i oiiity of making the type
of request under investigation.
Content categories
For descriptive purposes, the involuntary behavior
request group and the noncompliant behavior request group
were divided into six basic groups based on the content of
the request. Due to the range of requests described, these
subgroups vary in homogeneity, but they still enable a
useful characterization of the data.
involuntary behav ior request content categories
. In
the first subgroup (N=5) of the involuntary behavior request
group, subjects reported requests in which the desired
response from the other was more concern for the subjects'
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Table 1
Spontaneous Comments on the Problematic Nature ofInvoluntary Behavior Requests
and Moncompliant Behavior Requests
"All those things run through my mind, but I never asked ifbecause lf you asked for them, it wouldn't be spontaneous
for the other person to do it?" 3 wait
"Yes, I wish he'd do it without my having to ask Himeemotions shouldn't have to be told." 9 ° d
Subject referred to potential response to "Be spontaneous"Injunction as "not exactly spontaneous any longer?"
"You can't ask for something spontaneous."
you tani^ Val^^ Y ° U have to ask for something
"It's kind of hard to tell someone they should want to soendtime with you. They should get it on their own instead ofhaving somebody tell them."
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feeUngS
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be looking for a _
nurturant, empathic, or supportive response from the
respondent. Three subjects in this subgroup describe
-guest episodes in which they were upset by their boy
friends' immediate behavior. For example, one subject
reported a situation in which she was unhappy and tearful
about problems with her parents. when her boy friend
appeared to her to be less than supportive, she angrily
confronted hi,: "why don't you hug me? You don't even want
to hug me!" Of the remaining two subjects in this subgroup,
one described asking her father to be more patient when he
was teaching her about something.
Since patience might be defined in terms of specific
actions, e.g., going more slowly, to request more patience
need not necessarily represent a request for a change in
feeling. m this subject's case, however, it was clear from
her statements that she wanted her father to feel
differently when he was instructing her—she wanted him to
be more sensitive and concerned about where she was at with
the material under consideration. The last subject in this
subgroup talked about asking a male friend for more
enthusiasm and support for her activities.
The second subgroup (N=5) of the involuntary behavior
request group involved requests for basic shifts in the
respondents' feelings. In all of these cases, the request
was repeated on several occasions over an extended period of
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time and four subjects reported making the request over a
number of years. The desired response in this subgroup
seemed to be a change in the respondent's personality.
Examples include one subject's effort to get her boy friend
to be more caring for others and another subject's
insistence that her boy friend should enjoy his studies.
The latter example, of course, is a classic in the field due
to its treatment in Change (Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch,
1974)
.
In the third subgroup (M=4) of the involuntary behavior
request group, the desired response from the respondent was
for a stronger feeling for the subject. In one case a
subject reported directly telling a male friend with whom
she desired a more romantic relationship, "I think you
should feel more towards me than you do," and another
subject described telling her gay lover, "I want you to want
me as much (and) in the same way (as) I want you." The
other two cases involved more indirect requests for
closeness with the subject. One subject asked a man with
whom she desired more closeness to relax with her and not to
worry about hurting her; the other subject told her boy
friend, "I want you to want to stop seeing your other girl
f r iend .
"
The remaining three subgroups of the involuntary
behavior request group contain two subjects each. In the
first the request was for the desire to show a f fect ion--f or
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example, one subject told her boy friend, »! want you ^
-nt to show me how you feel towards me through actions -
in the second, the request was for snjo yraent of a shared
activity with the subject-one subject asKed her brother to
enjoy pl aying basketball with her and the other subject
asked her boy friend t- n pnin,, +. n ,y r. o e joy talking with her as much as he
would with his friends. The last subgroup includes two
miscellaneous items: one subject's request to a male friend
who wanted a romantic relationship not to feel as he did,
the classic, "Why can't you love me as a friend and not as a
girl friend?" and another subject's request to her boy
friend not to worry about her commitment to him.
Discussion. The involuntary behavior requests
described by subjects included several that would be widely
recognized as "paradoxical," in particular the injunction to
enjoy studying mentioned above, but also those request in
which the emphasis was on wanting the respondent "to want"
to do something. However, the formal definition of the
request type in terms of any request for nonpurposef u
1
behavior did expand the variety of reports offered by
subjects. The key to understanding the sample requests as
requests for involuntary behavior is simply to ask whether
one could purposefully perform the behavior requested. In
every case, the request was at least in part for an
emotional shift and emotions as Averill (1980a) has pointed
out are experienced passively.
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first subgroup (N = 5 ) of the noncompliant behavior cequest
group consists of requests for independence fro™ the
subject. subjects in this subgroup described asking the
respondent to be more independent in relation to the
subject-for example, one subject told her boy friend,
"Don't revolve your life around me. Just live your own life
and don't have it so hung up on me."
In the second subgroup (N=3) of the noncompliant
behavior request group, subjects reported on requests
closely related to those in the first subgroup. They
described telling the respondent to be more independent of
other people. One of these subjects advised her sister to
be more independent, especially with respect to the sister's
husband: "You have to stick up for yourself and decide what
you want in life."
In the third subgroup (N=4) of the noncompliant
behavior request group, subjects reported requests for self-
initiative in the respondent, i.e., subjects were asking the
respondent to do something on their own or without being
sked. In two cases, the requested behavior was specific,
example, one subject reported a long discussion with her
boy friend about whether he would spend all of his spring
vacation with her or only part of it. Although she very
much wanted his company throughout the vacation, she was
loathe to make demands and so explained: "I want you to do
a
Fo r
you
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what
!
want you to do. If you're deciding to do it just
because
! want you todoit
, ^ not do it al all "
in two other cases, subjects as.ed for non-specific
behaviors to be performed on the initiative of the
respondent. One subject told her boy friend, »! wish
would think about doing little things for rae without me
having to give you a hint or having to come right out an
tell you."
The fourth subgroup (N=6) of noncompliant behavior
requests involved requests for a surprise. Four subjects
reported requests for specific surprises including flowers,
a Christmas gift, and even a surprise birthday party. Two
subjects in this subgroup described request for nonspecific
surprises, for example, one subject described an episode in
which she simply told her boy friend, "Bring me a surprise."
The fifth and sixth noncompliant behavior request
subgroups each contained one subject only. m the fifth
subgroup, the request was for dominance with respect to
studying. The subject told her sister: "Make me study. I
have to get this done and I don't feel like it." in the
sixth subgroup, the subject described getting into fights
with her boy friend in which she would demand that he defy
her: "Yell at me. Tell me to go to hell and fight with me.
Don't just sit there like a spineless jellyfish. Fight with
me . "
Discussion
.
As in the involuntary behavior request
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9roup, a number of the requests described by subjects in the
noncompliant behavior request group represented injunctions
commonly referred to as paradoxical in the iiterature.
These include the request for independence from the subject,
the request for a surprise, and the request for defiance,
in each of these subgroups, a compliant response to the
request may be readily seen to stand in contradiction to the
desired response.
While the requests noted above represent clear examples
of noncompliant behavior requests, the inclusion of the
remaining subgroups requires clarification of the formal
issues involved. First, how is the request for independence
in relation to others an example of a noncompliant behavior
request? This classification is based on the meaning of the
response vis-a-vis the request and the requester. if a
person is told to be independent of others, his/her attempt
to comply with the request counts in a formal sense as
dependent behavior with respect to the requester. The
respondent is now doing what s/he has been told to do and so
is dependent in relation to the requester. In order to be
independent of the requester, the person must refuse to act
independently with others thereby defying the request. So,
in relation to the requester, independent behavior counts as
dependent behavior and dependent behavior counts as
independent behavior.
With respect to the third subgroup of the noncompliant
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behavior request group, i.e., the request for mf_
initiative in the respondent, an issue needing edification
i. «hy these requests should not he considered involuntary
behavior requests. For example, the subject who wanted her
boy friend to decide on his own to spend all of his spring
vacation with her was indicating indirectly that she wanted
him "to want" to do it. m the other cases of the request
for self-initiated actions, a similar dynamic may be
implied, m all three cases, the assignment of the request
to the noncompliant behavior request group was made on the
basis of the subject's emphasis on requesting that the
respondent act independently of the request. The desire for
a change in the respondent's feelings was conveyed by
implication only.
The inclusion of the injunction, "Make me study," as a
noncompliant behavior request also deserves formal
clarification. This injunction may be considered a request
for domination with respect to a specific behavior. The
subject asked to be forced to do something she would rather
not do— she requested a dominant response from the
respondent. A dominant response, however, by definition
cannot be a compliant response and when a dominant response
is requested, a formal paradox emerges. In this case, if the
respondent complies with the injunction by telling the
requester to study, the respondent has not been dominant,
but submissive vis-a-vis the request. The respondent is not
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dominating the requester, but onlv f«n« .
,
u t: y following directions. if
the respondent is submissive by not tellina t-hox "wu c i g he requester to
study, then the respondent has defied the request and is
acting in a dominant fashion towards the requester. A
compliant response counts as noncompliance with the request
and vice versa.
Before leaving the consideration of the request types
presented here, a general qualifying statement is in order.
Throughout the discussion of the content subgroups, the
formal classification of the requests has been a primary
consideration. The use of a formal definition rather than
specific examples in selecting requests appropriate for the
study resulted in the inclusion of several request types not
previously reviewed in the literature. in some cases, the
application of the formal definition may have appeared
forced. This process, however, is justified on the basis of
the emphasis on form in the paradoxical communication
literature. Explanations of the significance of paradoxical
injunctions have always focused on the formal features of
the message, so a study of such requests must be based on
their formal definition.
Demographic and relationship data
Identifying information
. As specified in Chapter IV,
all subjects were undergraduate women. The mean age for
subjects reporting on involuntary behavior requests was 20.9
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years. The respondents t o these requests represented a
9ronp of 18 man and 2 women; their average age was 24.6
Years. The mean age for subjects reporting on noncompliant
behavior request, was 19.8 years. The respondents to these
requests represented a group of 14 men and 6 women; their
average age was 23.8 years.
For both involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests, the respondents to the
subjects' requests were on the average older than the
subjects and were more likely to be men than women. This
may be attributed, in part, to the fact that in the
involuntary behavior request group 12 respondents and in the
noncompliant behavior request group, 13 respondents were boy
friends at the time of the request. The age difference may
be associated with this relationship difference-boy friends
in our society being customarily the same age or older than
their partners. Further, two of the noncompliant behavior
requests and one of the involuntary behavior requests were
addressed to the subjects' parents—the large age difference
here also contributed to some extent to the greater average
age of respondents compared with subjects.
Rel ationship type
. As mentioned above, for both
request groups, the majority of requests were made to
persons with whom the subject had a romantic or dating
relationship. In the involuntary behavior request group,
nine subjects described requests to men with whom they had
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id
a woman
an ongoing romantic relationship; three subjects describee
requests to men with whom the romantic relationship had
terminated; and one subject described a request to
with whom a romantic relationship had terminated. m the
noncompliant behavior request group, eight subjects
described requests to men with whom they had an ongoing
romantic relationship and five subjects described requests
to men with whom the romantic relationship had terminated.
Involuntary behavior requests were next most frequently
described as addressed within a friendship-three requests
to male friends and one request to a female friend were
reported. Two subjects described noncompliant behavior
requests addressed to female friends while no subjects
reported on such a request addressed to male friend.
The remainder of subjects described requests addressed
to family members. Two subjects reported on involuntary
behavior requests made to brothers and one subject described
such a request made to her father. Two subjects reported on
noncompliant behavior requests made to sisters, one subject
described such a request made to her brother, and two
subjects reported on such requests addressed to their
mothers. For a summary of the types of relationships within
which subjects described requests, see Tables 2 and 3.
Discuss ion
. There are at least two possible
explanations for the observed preponderance of requests
described within the context of romantic relationships. The
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Table 2
Relationship Type:
Involuntary Behavior Requests
Relationship Type RpJ^L *. gemale"
" espondent Respondent Total
Romantic: ongoing 9
Romantic: terminated 3 7 9
Friendship
^
1 4
Sibling t 1 4
Parent , 0
1
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Table 3
Relationship Type:
Moncompliant Behavior Requests
Romantic: ongoing 3
Romantic: terminated 5 3
Friendship 5
Sibling [ 2 2
Parent 2 3
2 2
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£-st is that s 0me of the elicitation examples biased
-ports in this lection, Eor example, », want you t0 want
to spend time with me " or »n^t, , Bring me flowers
spontaneously." A second emanation I. that involuntary
behavior requests and nonco rapliant behavior requests were
-re salient and more frequent within the subjects' ro.antic
relationships. This, in turn, could be due to romantic
relationships being characterized by the active and
continuing negotiation of psychological needs. Expectations
may be more intense leading to the explicit venture of a
request whereas a similar issue with a relative may be
ignored due to resignation with the status quo and a friend
may be dropped if problems and dissatisfactions grow beyond
a certain point. The question of the relational meaning of
the requests under investigation is further explored in
subsequent sections.
Frequency and durati on of requests and responses
In the literature, "paradoxical" injunctions have been
described in temporal isolation. in general, the request is
presented as it occurs in a single episode. One descriptive
question for this study involved asking how involuntary
behavior requests and noncompliant behavior requests are
negotiated through time. Subjects were asked how many times
they had made their request, how many responses occurred
following their request, and how much time elapsed between
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the first request episode and the last request or response
episode
.
in the involuntary behavior request group, subjects
-ported making requests between 1 and 1012 times with the
median frequency being 4.5 requests. The subject who
estimated 1012 instances of making her request was
describing a ten year campaign to get her younger brother to
be more calm and less explosive. The total number of
requests was based on her estimate of the weekly frequency
of making the request. Subjects reported between 1 and 1896
responses following the first request with the median
frequency being 17. Again, the extreme case of 1896
responses stems from the interactions of the subject
mentioned above with her brother and was an estimate based
on a weekly frequency of responses. The length of time
elapsed between the first request and the last request or
response ranged in the involuntary behavior request group
from less than a day to approximately ten years, again in
the case previously mentioned. The median length of time
over which these requests were negotiated was 5.44 months.
In the noncompliant behavior request group, subjects
reported making their requests between 1 and 16 times with a
median frequency of 4 request episodes. Estimates of the
number of responses made following noncompliant behavior
requests were not clearly given in three cases; of the
remaining 17 subjects, between 1 and 300 responses were
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report with a median frequency of 6 . The length Qf
•lapsed between the first request and ^ ^ ^
-ponse for the noncompllant behavior requesfc group^
ti-S over which the requests were negotiated was 6 . 9 raontns
° 1SCUSSi0n
--
The
-1« -merest of the findings
reported hete on the temporal characteristics of involuntary
behavxor requests and noncompliant behavior requests is
simply that both request types are commonl Y negotiated over
an extended period of time and typically involve repetitions
of both request and response episodes. This finding
contrasts with the typical presentation of these requests in
the literature in terms of single episodes and supports the
need to evaluate such a request in the particular temporal
framework within which it occurs.
Research Questions
Group comparisons
One goal of the present study was to assess whether
formal differences between involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests are associated with
differences in how these requests are negotiated in social
interaction. One approach to this question involved the
comparison of mean ratings between the two request groups of
the variables assessed by subjects. These variables
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included the episodic characteristics of valence, coherence
and cont«Pl< life-script and relationship reflexiv. need
strength; and ratings of responses following the request in
terms of satisfaction, compliance, and ^voluntariness/
noncompliance
.
'T* tests for independent means were performed
comparing the involuntary behavior request group with the
noncompliant behavior request group on all the variables
described above except for control. For the response
episodes, comparisons were based on the 16 subjects in the
involuntary behavior request group and the 15 subjects in
the noncompliant behavior request group who reported a less
and a more satisfying response episode. Comparisons were
made within each of these response types. The subjects who
reported only one response episode were not included in this
analysis. Out of all the variables compared, two showed
heterogeneous variance and the >f was calculated specially
to account for this. No significant differences between the
groups were found. Because of the categorical nature of the
data on control, a chi-square analysis was performed for
this variable. No significant group differences were found.
Discussion. The failure to find significant
differences between the involuntary behavior reguest group
and the noncompliant behavior request group is not grounds
for asserting the lack of such differences. It is possible
that the variables assessed are not those which distinguish
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between the groups or that error inn in measurement masked
actual diffpronpoc u~"er.nces. However, the negative findings are
suggestive of a lack of differences in „« .^ s l women's perceptions
of interactions surrounding involuntary behavior requests
and noncompliant behavior requests. The theoretical
interest of this finding is that the formally paradoxical
nature of the noncompliant behavior request does not appear
to have a dramatically different i.pact on interaction
compared with the formally problematic nature of the
involuntary behavior request. Merely the potential for
meaning oscillation inherent in the nature of the
noncompliant behavior request does not appear to propel
interaction along a distinctive course. This would
contradict explanations based on logical paradox of the
source of difficulty with "paradoxical" requests.
Satisfaction with responses
A second research question for the study involved the
existential issue, do satisfying responses to involuntary
behavior requests and noncompliant behavior requests occur?
This question was addressed through asking subjects to rate
the degree of their satisfaction with the responses
described following the request. Before presenting the data
on subjects' satisfaction with responses following their
requests, the types of responses are examined.
According to the interview format, subjects were asked
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how many responses occurred fo! lowing the first time they
-de their request. When subjects reported ,ore than one
such response, they were asked to describe the least
satisfying response episode and the most satisfying response
episode. m some cases, subjects explained that they could
not differentiate multiple episodes on the basis of
satisfaction and so described a single episode only.
Subjects who recalled only one response episode, of course,
reported on that episode alone. The result of this
procedure was that for the involuntary behavior request
group, three subjects described single response episodes and
16 subjects described two response episodes contrasting in
the degree of the subject's satisfaction with the response.
One subject described two response episodes, but asserted
that these did not differ in terms of her satisfaction with
the response and so her ratings were averaged across the
episodes to produce a single response episode. In the
noncompliant behavior request group, five subjects described
single response episodes and 15 subjects described two
response episodes contrasting in the degree of the subject's
satisfaction with the response.
In order to assess whether satisfying responses occur
following the requests under investigation, the number of
subjects reporting at least one satisfying episode following
their request was determined. A response was considered
satisfying based on a rating of 4 or less on a 9 point
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sat lS faction scale in wh ich x was Vompletely satis£ying „
and 9 was "completely dissatisfying." Accocding fcQ ^
definition, la subjects
(90.0%, in the in>0lunt3ry behaviot
re,UeSt 9COUP reP° rt9d 3 satisfying response and 17 subjects
(85.01, in the noncompliant behaviot request group repotted
a satisfying response. Also of interest here is the finding
that 14 subjects
,70.01, in the involuntary behavior request
group and 11 subjects ,„.„, .„ ^ noncompliant
request group rated a response "completely satisfying" on
the satisfaction scale.
Dissatisfaction with response episodes was also
reported. m the involuntary behavior request group, nine
subjects (45.0%) described a response episode which they
rated 6 or more on the satisfaction scale and in the
noncompliant behavior request group, six subjects (30.0%)
described a response episode which they rated 6 or more on
the satisfaction scale. Only three subjects (15.0%) in the
involuntary behavior request group rated a response
"completely dissatisfying" and only one subject (5.0%) in
the noncompliant behavior request group labeled a response
"completely dissatisfying." The results on satisfaction
with response episodes are summarized in Table 4.
Discussion. The finding of a large majority of
subjects reporting satisfaction with a response following an
involuntary behavior request or a noncompliant behavior
request lends strong support to the position that these
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Table 4
Satisfaction with the Response Following an
Involuntary Behavior Request or a
Noncompliant Behavior Request
Rating on
Satisfaction
Scale 3
or less4
1
6 or more
9
Involuntary
Behavior Request
13 (90.0%) b
14 (70.0%)
9 (45.0%)
3 (15.0%)
Noncompl iant
Behavior Request
17
11
(85.0%)
(55.0%)
6 (30.0%)
1 (5.0%)
-
iM
s
^^L"iVi5«V^%oa'^v f 20 and total
litter more satisfying 1X1 °* ^TiTs!*' one
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-quest types are not inevitably associated w . th
^satisfaction in dose rela tl onships. This contradicts
the assumption coMonly expressed in the literature that
these requests necessarily i nh i bit the r#qu„t, r ^
-joying the response following the revest. The finding o£
relatively few cases in which the subject felt completely
dissatisfied with the response following an involuntary
behavior request or a noncompl iant behavior request
suggests, in contrast, that a complete rejection of such a
response may be the exception rather than the rule in
interactions involving these requests. This f inding has
considerable significance for understanding the nature and
waning of these kinds of requests in interaction.
Satisfaction, compliance, and t he involuntary nr
noncompl iant nature of resgonsg In Chapter IV, one
research question was proposed in terms of an hypothesis
concerning the relationship between satisfaction with the
response following an involuntary behavior request or a
noncompliant behavior request and the interpretation of that
response as involuntary or noncompliant for responses seen
as compliant. To recapitulate, it was predicted that when a
response following one of these requests is seen as
compliant, i.e., the respondent is understood to be making
an effort to fulfill the request, then the degree of
satisfaction with the response is positively related to the
degree to which the response is also interpreted as
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involuntary or noncompliant according to the type of
behavior requested. For example, given a request for
independent behavior, 1 £ the respondent produces a response
which the requester sees as an effort to fulfill the
request, then the requester's satisfaction is related to
whether the response is also seen as noncompliant, i.e.,
independent. This formulation derives from the view that
when a response is interpreted as simultaneously compliant
and involuntary or noncompliant, then satisfaction occurs.
Conversely, if
. response is seen as merely compliant and
not involuntary or noncompliant, then dissatisfaction
occurs
The determination of a compliant response was made on
the basis of a rating of the statement, "The other person
acted as s/he did because of my request/' 4 or less on a 9
point scale with 1 being "strongly agree" and 9 being
"strongly disagree." Fourteen subjects in the involuntary
behavior request group and 14 subjects in the noncompliant
behavior request group rated at least one response compliant
according to this criterion. in some cases, subjects rated
both the responses they described as compliant according to
this criterion. Because of the correlation method of
analysis, it was not possible to use two responses from a
single subject. In order to maximize the sample size for
the correlation, a random decision process was used to
select one of the two responses described as compliant by
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«- subject. This selection process designed inciu^
an equal number of less satisfying ^
response episodes.
in neither the involuntary behavior request group nor
the noncompliant behavior request group was there a
significant correlation (Pearson product moment correlation
coefficient, between satisfaction and the interpretation of
the response as involuntary or nonco rapl ia nt for responses
seen as compliant. The correlation for the involuntary
behavior request group was
.27 and the correlation for the
noncompliant behavior request group was
.26. Thus, there
was no support gained for the hypothesis of a positive
relationship here. However, it is of interest that a number
of cases in both request groups did follow the hypothesized
pattern thus supporting the possibility of this meaning
pattern in interactions involving these requests. In the
involuntary behavior request group, five subjects (25.0%)
reported satisfaction at a level of 4 or less on the
satisfaction scale and a rating of the involuntary nature of
the response at a level of four or less on the corresponding
scale for rasponses deemed compliant. Four subjects (20.0?)
reported the Converse— for responses deemed compliant, they
rated satisfaction 6 or more and the involuntary nature of
the response 6 or more. In the noncompliant behavior
request group, 9 subjects (45.0%) rated satisfaction 4 or
less and the noncompliant nature of the response 4 or less
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for responses seen as compliant; in the opposite direction
2 subjects (10.0%) rat ed the response 6 or more on the
satisfaction scale and the noncompliant nature of the
response 6 or more for responses deemed compliant.
DiSCUSSi0n
-
Interest here in the interpretation of
responses following involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests derives from the position
presented in the literature that it is the very assessment
of a response as compliant which diqualifies it from being
considered involuntary or noncompliant and therefore from
being a successful response to the request. Compliance is
purposeful and therefore cannot also be involuntary and
compliance cannot be noncompliant. On theoretical grounds,
it has been argued that these apparent contradictions do not
necessarily surface in interaction and that it is possible
to simultaneously interpret a response to an involuntary
behavior request or a noncompliant behavior request as
compliant and involuntary or noncompliant. For the study,
it was further hypothesized that satisfaction would occur
when this apparently contradictory attribution was made and
that dissatisfaction would occur when it wasn't, i.e., when
the compliant response was not also seen as involuntary or
noncompliant. While this predicted relationship did not
hold in terms of a significant correlation, a number of
cases were found in which the predicted relationship was
found among the variables of compliance, satisfaction, and
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the involuntary or nonco.pl iant nature of the response
-is suggests th.t Wiethe predicted
th6Se threS VarlablGS
~* ™ »» ^dominant tendency in
these types of interaction, it at least represents a
Potential meaning pattern in these interactions. Howeve,
due to the unknown reliability and validity of the ratings
and possible ambiguit.es of waning, no firm conclusions can
be drawn as to the hypothesized relationship a.ong the
variables of compliance, satisfaction, and the involuntary
or noncompliant nature of the response.
Requests and Noncompliant Behavior Requests;
A Qualitative Analysis
in Chapter III, the metarules formally defining the
nature of involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant
behavior requests are presented accordin g to CMM
nomenclature. At that point it was argued that these rules
are variably invoked in social interaction depending
predominantly on the dynamics of the life-script and
relationship levels of meaning. This section departs from
the formal analysis offered above and explores the nature of
these life-script and relational processes in terms of the
relevant content. Data from the study are used to
illustrate the proposed analysis.
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This section is organic in two parts. First, an
overview of the analysis is presented and second, this is
explored and discussed with reference to specific cases
drawn from the study.
Overv iew
The focus on a formal analysis of involuntary behavior
requests and noncompliant behavior requests has kept at bay
the question of the meaning of these requests. While it is
assumed here that meaning is context-dependent and that,
therefore, there can be no inherent meaning to these request
types which holds absolutely in all situations, it is
suggested that the essence of these requests is an
injunction for autonomy. This is most apparent in the case
of the noncompliant behavior request. Here the respondent
is asked to act purposefully and independently with respect
to the requester which is, of course, the definition of
autonomous behavior. The most obvious example is the
request for independence.
With respect to involuntary behavior requests, the
injunction for autonomy is not so clear. The connection
depends on the observation that in ordinary interaction, the
involuntary behavior request manifests itself in terms of an
injunction for feeling or emotion. The respondent is asked
"to want" to do something or to feel differently. As
Averill (1980a) has pointed out, such affective experiences
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reflect highly personal evaluative judgments; they
communicate most genuinely "what that person considers
important about himself, even those aspects o£ his
personality that he may not recognize or admit" (AveriU,
1980a, p. 310,. Because feelings and emotions declare the
individual's beliefs in this way, they count as autonoraous
behaviors. One cannot be compelled or forced to have an
emotion; a feeling reflects the social actor's
individuality.
Granted that involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests represent injunctions for
autonomy, what is the inherent significance of such an
injunction? The most apparent issue entailed here concerns
control. if i ask you to do something independently or "to
want" to do something I am asserting my own control over
your behavior, while at the same time requesting you to act
autonomously, i.e., to behave in a manner which is free of
external constraint. This is the contradiction which may
define these requests as problematic. However, this
contradiction is not so much an occasional problem in close
relationships as a central issue which is constantly being
negotiated in such relat i onsh i ps--how much control do
partners have over their own and over each other's behavior?
Control is the central issue raised by involuntary
behavior requests and noncompliant behavior requests, but
the significance of this issue derives most importantly from
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its interaction with the issue of closeness. Karpel
,1976,
provides a discussion of four relationships modes which is
helpful in this regard.
"Unrelatedness" is the term he uses
to describe a psychologically primitive relationship mode in
which the partners tolerate only the most minimal
involvement. in "our^ fusion » = » i • u*.-,p . t , a slightly less primitive
relationship mode, the boundary between the partners is
completely lost and each person experiences the other as the
self. The next relationship mode, "ambivalent fusions-
represents a more mature interpersonal stance in which
partners experience conflict over personal identity and
relational attachment. Partners are ambivalently attracted
to the relationship—on the one hand they long to give
themselves up to the closeness of involvement, but on the
other hand, they fear the loss of self they experience in
such closeness. In "dialogue," the fourth relationship mode
and the most mature, partners have discovered how to
negotiate the contradiction of being involved with each
other, but at the same time being separate. They are
capable of true intimacy and, at the same time, highly
independent activities.
The relationship of control to the four relationship
modes presented above is as follows. In unre 1 a tedness
,
neither person feels any control over the other's behavior.
In pure fusion, the experience is just the reverse—each
partner feels complete control over the other and feels
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completely controlled by the other
. In ^
control is a large component of the conflict and oscillation
of the relationship. As the partners move together, one or
both experiences the other person as having too much
control, as being constricting. This may be a primary
factor in the flight from the relationship or other
symptomatic resolutions. Karpel
,1976, discusses several of
these in more depth. i„ dialogue, partners experience a
balance of being able to influence each other, but they
tolerate the lack of complete control.
How, then, do involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests connect with these issues of
closeness and control? By expressing an injunction for
autonomy, these request types highlight the problem of how
much control each partner will have, and this process
interacts with how much closeness the partners feel with
each other. Partners who function in a relationship mode of
unrelatedness would not express involuntary behavior
requests or noncompliant behavior requests— they do not feel
able to exert control of any kind over each other's
behavior. By contrast, the partners bound by pure fusion
experience involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant
behavior requests as completely consistent with their
relationship. Because the other is experienced as the self,
a request for enjoyment or independence does not represent a
true push for the other's autonomy, but rather as a message
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to another part of the self as to appropriate behaviot
_ ^
*ey here is that the respondent e X per le nces the injunction
as another invitation to share in the identity of the
requester. The capacity to be co rapletely controlled by and
able to control the other does not raise anxiety for the
partners
.
in ambivalent fusion, issues of control and closeness
are central and it is within this relationship mode that the
traditional understanding of "paradoxical" injunctions is
most relevant. Recall that these injunctions have been seen
as necessarily frustrating either because the respondent's
attempted response is disqualified by virtue of being
compliant or because the respondent finds it impossible to
even attempt compliance due to the nature of the request.
For example, if the respondent is told to be more
affectionate, his/her attempts to comply may be rejected by
the requester as non-genuine because the behavior has
occurred only following the request. Or the respondent may
feel stymied by the problem of how to be affectionate on
command. The problem here is that control is understood by
the partners in the absolute terms characteristic of the
ambivalently fused relationship. To respond to a request
counts as being completely controlled by the requester.
This fantasy of complete control is at the same time a
fantasy of complete closeness. However, in the ambivalently
fused relationship, this fantasized closeness is equally
158
•mt*« a„a feared. This u why the attempted response ^
be disqualified or not attested, because of the underlying
anxiety over closeness Tk„. n.S
'
hus
'
th e request reflects the
assumed possibility of complete merging and the
disqualification represents the protection against this
fusion
.
in the dialogic relationship mode, partners have moved
beyond the fantasies and fears surrounding control and
closeness in the ambivalently fused relationship. They
accept the reality of limits and the essential separateness
of the individuals, within this relationship mode, then,
the injunction for autonomy represented by an involuntary
behavior request or a noncompliant behavior request is
consistent with the sense that influence is possible, but
not absolute influence. This allows both for the respondent
to attempt a response which is simultaneously compliant and
autonomous and for the requester to confirm and appreciate
this response. It is this acceptance of limits to control
and closeness that makes possible the experience of true
mutuality in the dialogic relationship mode.
Case illustrations
As noted above, in the unre 1 a tedness relationship mode,
involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior
requests are not made due to the partners' experience of a
lack of reciprocal influence. Naturally, then, no subjects
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in the study reported on these requests within a relational
context of unrelatedness. Pure fusion is a primitive
relationship mode and in a normal study sample, one would
expect to find few if any subjects describing requests
within such relationships. m the study, one subject
described an uncommon relationship, that with her identical
twin, which appeared to approach pure fusion. This
subject's interactions with her twin around a noncompliant
behavior request are discussed first. Following this, an
example of a request made within an ambivalently fused
relationship is reviewed and the section concludes with an
example of a request made within what appeared to a dialogic
relationship mode.
The subject who described her request in a relationship
context approaching pure fusion was reporting on her
interactions with an identical twin. The evidence of a
highly fused relationship came from the subject's several
remarks on the lack of separation between herself and her
twin. For example, the subject said, "I consider us like
one person," and at another point she volunteered, "We •
hardly have to speak, we know what each other are thinking."
The request described by the subject was for dominance with
regard to studying; she told her sister on several
occasions, "Make me study. I have to get this done and I
don't feel like it." In the less satisfying situation
described by the subject, the sister, who was already
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studying, siraply cesponded
, ,.U| ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
whxle so just get to it." The subject experienced this
response positively, saying, -It was exactly what ( ^
looking for," but indicated a degree of ambivalence by also
admitting concern that the response might have encouraged a
lack of self-reliance. m addition, the subject denied that
her twin actually took control of her behavior:
"She was
reinforcing it, but she didn't have the last say on whether
I was go i ng to do it."
This subject also described a less satisfying response
from her twin in response to a similar request. m this
situation, the sisters were up late studying for finals and
the subject asked her twin to make her stay up.- This time,
instead of encouraging the subject, her twin accepted her
desire to go to sleep by saying, "Don't worry about it, I'll
help you out," meaning that she would help the subject
during the exam. The subject also thought that her twin
might have challenged her by saying, "I can't believe you're
going to sleep when we're not through with this. if you
don't want a good grade, go ahead, go to sleep." The
outcome of this exchange was that the subject stayed up
another hour or so to study and her twin studied another
half hour after that.
The subject asserted that her twin had most influence
over her in this situation when she accepted the subject's
desire to go to sleep. The subject said that "would have
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got me the most. She would have been confident in the
morning and I wouldn't have been. We've always done the
same, so I know what she can do, I can do." The subject
also expressed some dissatisfaction with her sister's
decision to stay up because of the subject's intense desire
for sleep. Overall, her satisfaction with her twin's
response was mixed, but slightly more positive than
negative.
In relationships characterized by pure fusion, it has
been suggested that involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests are experienced as messages
to another part of the self. m this case of the identical
twins, the more satisfying episode described reflects this
sense of oneness between the sisters. The request was for
encouragement in the effort to study and the response was
exactly what was desired. It is important to note, however,
that the subject did not experience her sister as taking
control of her behavior. This resistance to experiencing
the sister's control as well as the subject's concern with
self-reliance noted above are signs of ambivalence over
possible fusion in this relationship. In a completely fused
relationship, one would expect satisfaction with being
con trol led
.
Regarding fusion in the relationship, it is significant
that the twin's more influential remark in the less
satisfying episode was one which suggested difference
between the sisters~the subject could go to sleep an d the
twin would help he, in the morning. The subject , s alarm in
response to this cogent reflected her concern that the twin
would do better than she on her exams, while certainly a
sign of competitiveness in the relationship, the subject's
anxiety may also be interpreted as resulting from concern
over losing identity with her sister. Here the noncompliant
behavior request did not lead to confirmation of the sense
of closeness between the sisters, but rather triggered a
sense of d i f feren tness and autonomy that was difficult for
the subject to accept.
in this case, then, of a relationship approaching pure
fusion, the noncompliant behavior request functioned within
limits in one situation to confirm the closeness of the
sisters. In the other situation it was associated with the
anxiety-provoking possibility of separ a teness. As an
injunction for autonomy, the request was a part of the
negotiation of closeness and control in this relationship,
The second case to be discussed is one in which the
involuntary behavior request played a central role in an
ambivalently fused relationship. The subject described her
request in the context of a five year romantic relationship
with a man. She had broken off the relationship a year
prior to the interview largely because of her
dissatisfaction with her boy friend's response to her
request. The subject was much involved in helping
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actlvities-for example, she volunteered at a half-way house
for alcoholic women and she took in disadvantaged children
for summer stays-and the request to her boy friend in the
interview was that he should be similarly concerned for
others. The subject saw her boy friend as a basically
selfish person and understood her request as directed
towards changing his personality so as to be more
compassionate towards others. It was the subject's eventual
conclusion that her boy friend could not make this desired
change that led her to discontinue a romantic involvement
with him.
During the interview, the subject described two basic
responses that her boy friend made following the request.
The less satisfying type consisted of occasions when the boy
friend reported on actions he had taken which he believed
showed that he was compassionate towards others. For
example, the subject described a phone call in which the boy
friend told her that he had participated in a benefit dinner
for a nursing home held at the home. So, in addition to the
financial contribution for the dinner, the boy friend had
made actual contact with needy individuals. The subject
perceived this effort as one directly solely towards
pleasing her and gaining her affection. At the time she
expressed polite interest, but felt that, if her boy friend
thought about her response later, he would have realized
that she wasn't impressed. The subject also said that in
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other s.milar situations with her boy f rie nd she would often
tell him, "You don't know how bad people have it."
The second type of response that she described was one
in which her boy friend listened to her talk about her own
work with clients. The subject said that her boy f rie nd was
very pleasant during these conversations and that he made
useful and perceptive comments. At the time of these
episodes, the subject said she believed her boy friend was
changing and that he was sincerely concerned about others.
However, in retrospect, the subject felt that in these
situations, as in the type described above, her boy friend
was only making a show of concern for her sake: "He was
probably just giving me the right answers and shutting off
the issue as fast as he could in the best possible way
without me realizing it."
This case illustrates a particular relational
negotiation of an involuntary behavior request, one which is
in line with how this request type has been traditionally
understood in the literature. The subject expressed her
request and then disqualified her boy friend's efforts to
fulfill her request for being compliant— he only acted in a
compassionate and concerned way to please her, he didn't
really feel this way. Notably, the subject did not
disqualify all of her boy friend's responses when they were
made, his expressed concern about her work with people was
only disqualified in retrospect.
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The significance of the subject's interactions
surrounding her involuntary behavior request
.ay be best
understood within an appreciation of the dynamics of
ambivalent fusion. The most striking aspect of the
subject's report was her assertion that her boy friend's
responses following her request were nothing more than
efforts to please her. This disqualification reveals the
fantasy of complete control-the subject saw her boy friend
as acting without any degree of autonomy. within the
ambivalently fused relationship, however, complete control
threatens complete closeness and it was through the
Subject's disqualification of her boy friend's responses
following her request that she defended against fusion. In
fact, it was the subject's dissatisfaction with her boy
friend's capacity to fulfill her request that impelled her
finally to terminate the relationship. m other words, the
subject's disqualification of her boy friend's responses
shows her assumption of absolute control over him while at
the same time it represents the avoidance of the possibility
of pure fusion with him.
The third case to be discussed here is intended to
illustrate how a noncompliant behavior request may be
associated with a dialogic relationship mode. In this case,
the subject also described a romantic relationship which she
had broken off. Although in part the break-up was
associated with issues involved in her request, these were
and
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quite distinct from the previous example. This subject
reported that her request to her boy friend made on
approximately seven occasions was for hi, to bring her a
surprise. She specificaliy described one episode in which
her boy friend was borrowing her car to do some errands
she simply said to him, "Bring me a surprise." She
explained that she felt she was asking for a "symbol of
love" and that she "wanted him to say yes, but not to think
of it-'she wants me to do if-I wanted him to think it was
a good idea." The outcome was that upon returning, the boy
friend presented the subject with a blouse he had bought for
her. The subject reported complete satisfaction with her
boy friend's actions and explained: "I think he did what he
did because I asked him to, but I think once the request was
made, he enjoyed it."
The most satisfying response following the subject's
request occurred when her boy friend bought her an art print
that he knew was a special favorite of hers. He gave this
to her when they were separating for the summer. The
subject was completely surprised by this gift and
"thrilled." She said, "I thought it was really a thoughtful
thing to do and it showed how much he really cared."
The issue which led to the subject's breaking up with
her boy friend was that she felt she was too dependent on
him. So although she felt very positive about being able to
ask for and receive a surprise from him, this responsiveness
sa
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on his part also made her wonder if she relied too much on
his care and whether she could be independent. This is what
she broke off the relationship to discover.
The presence of the subject's ambivalence over being
too dependent on her boy friend is a sign that thi
relationship approached, but probably did not achiev
dialogical relationship mode, since within such
relationship mode, the growth and independence of the partner
would be fostered rather than retarded. However, the
negotiation of the noncompliant behavior request described
by the subject is consistent with a dialogic relationship
mode. Note that in the first exchange described, the
subject both desired and confirmed the other's response to
her request, i.e., she experienced influence over the
other's behavior, and at the same time the other's autonomous
fulfillment of the request. Having accepted some, but not
complete influence of her boy friend, the subject opened
herself fully to an experience of closeness with him. This
closeness prompted a small, but tolerable degree of anxiety.
In the second episode described, the subject saw her boy
friend's behavior as completely autonomous and gave herself
over again to an experience of intense intimacy. Without
the fear of fusion, this subject did not need to disqualify
her boy friend's behavior as merely compliant. Her
confirmation of his autonomy was simultaneously a
confirmation of their closeness.
s
Summa ry
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Despite widespread interest in the negotiation of
paradoxical injunctions in ordinary relationships, this
study is the first to explore empirically the simple
question, "what happens when these requests are made?" The
descriptive data gathered contradicts the general impression
of paradoxical communication gained in the literature.
First, involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant
behavior requests do not appear to be rare injunctions in
ordinary relationships. The large majority of subjects who
attended sessions had little difficulty identifying such a
request in their own experience. Although some self-
selection undoubtedly occurred, the fact remains that with
very little difficulty 40 undergraduate women were located
who could describe an example of an involuntary behavior
request or a noncompliant behavior request in a close
relationship.
A small group of subjects spontaneously responded to
the elicitation examples with reservations about the
desirability of making such requests. They were tuned into
the potential difficulties involved with these injunctions,
thus showing that the problems associated with these
requests in the literature are salient for a certain small
percentage of individuals. But again, the expression of
reservations was the exception rather than the rule. This
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suggests that doubts about these requests as typically
portrayed in the literature occur for relatively small
number of individuals; the majority proceed with these
injunctions without wondering whether they should make the
request or whether they wi 1 1 be able to trust the response
they receive.
The elicitation process showed certain noncompliant
behavior requests to be relatively more salient in subjects-
close relationships. Asking someone to be independent or to
do something on his/her own initiative was not uncommon for
these subjects. In the study sample, a number of the
requests described were familiar from the paradoxical
communication literature including, "Be independent/' and,
"You should enjoy studying." Other requests were more
novel— especially involuntary behavior requests for feeling
changes. The formal specification of involuntary behavior
requests and noncompliant behavior requests allows for the
broadening definition of what requests to include in these
categories beyond some vague reference to a "Be spontaneous"
injunction as typically given in the literature.
Subjects in this study typica 1 1 y descr ibed involuntary
behavior requests and noncompliant behavior requests in
romantic relationships, although it was not clear whether
this resulted from the elicitation examples given or from a
greater frequency and higher salience of these requests in
romantic relationships. Clear support in the study was
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obtained for the temporal extension of the negotiation of
involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior
-quests. Subjects typically reported making a particular
request on several occasions and receiving several responses
following their request. m the literature, the focus has
generally been on a particular request episode while this
study supports the need to examine the negotiation of the
request through time to better understand its meaning.
Turning to the more specific research questions
explored in the study, no support was found for the
existence of differences between ratings of interactions
involving involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant
behavior requests. Although the actual existence of group
differences cannot be clearly rejected on the basis of the
study, this finding does indicate the lack of dramatic
differences in the negotiation of formally paradoxical
noncompliant behavior requests and formally impossible
involuntary behavior requests. The lack of an obviously
greater difficulty dealing with injunctions which are
formally paradoxical provides some empirical support for the
conceptual argument that paradoxical communication forms do
not influence interaction in particular ways.
The study provides strong support for the existence of
satisfying outcomes to involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests. In fact, a large majority
of subjects reported at least one response with which they
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were essentially satisfied and a substantial group reported
being completely satisfied with at least one response
following their request. This reverses the expectation that
such requests necessarily lead to frustrating and
unsatisfying outcomes and it suggests that a completely
negative outcome to such a request may be the exception
rather than the rule in ordinary relationships.
A particular hypothesis was explored in the study,
i.e., when a response to an involuntary behavior request or
a noncompliant behavior request is seen as compliant, then
the degree of satisfaction with the response is related to
the degree to which the response is also seen as involuntary
or noncompliant according to the terms of the request. The
study did not show the hypothesized positive correlations,
although a number of cases did fit the predicted pattern.
The existence of these cases suggests that the
interpretation of compliance in the response following an
involuntary behavior request or a noncompliant behavior
request does not necessarily preclude satisfaction with the
response or the simultaneous interpretation of the response
as involuntary or noncompliant. Thus, the effort to fulfill
the request is not necessarily a basis for the
disqualification of the response, as has been suggested in
the 1 i terature.
A qualitative analysis of the negotiation of involuntary
behavior requests and noncompliant behavior requests was
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P-sented. It was argued thafc controi ^ ^
degree of closeness in the relationship and Karpel's (1976)
four relationship modes were used to locate these
connections. E „ less deV eloped relationship styles, control
and closeness are understood in absolute terms which are
either accepted and relished as in pure fusion or negotiated
ambivalently. m the more mature relationship mode of
dialogue, control and closeness are negotiated in a
nonabsolute fashion allowing each partner to retain autonomy
and influence. This enables a true experience of intimacy.
involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior
requests may be understood in terms of the themes of
closeness and control in the relationship modes presented
above. in relationships characterized by pure fusion, these
requests are consistent with the sense of complete closeness
and control. In ambivalently fused relationships, these
requests reflect the fantasy of complete closeness and
control while the disqualification of the response defends
against this eventuality. Within the dialogic relationship
mode, these requests are negotiated in such a way that some
but not complete control is exerted and the result is an
experience of genuine closeness.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This dissertation represents a reconsideration of the
paradoxical communication literature through the use of
conceptual clarification and empirical exploration. m
order to place this work in perspective, a number of issues
are discussed in this concluding chapter. First, the
significance of the concept of paradox in the development of
communications and family systems theories is reviewed and
within this context the importance of the conceptual
argument proposed in Chapter II is highlighted.
Recommendations for the future theoretical use of the
concept of paradox are also presented. Second, the major
contributions and limitations of the research findings
presented in Chapter V are discussed. Clinical applications
and directions for future empirical research are also
rev iewed
.
The significance of the literature on paradoxical
communication may be best understood within the development
of the systemic model of human transaction. Bateson and
later family and communications theorists were involved in
the effort to conceptualize human behavior at the
interactional level. As such, they moved dramatically away
from the motivational explanations of the psychoanalytic
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school and towards an emphasis on formal patterns in human
systems. instead of looking at the individual for a
psychological understanding of behavior, they looked to the
repetitive cycle of behavioral transactions to explain human
actions. For example, family homeostasis as discussed by
Jackson re-conceptualized psychiatric symptoms as a function
of the family system's tendency toward formal continuity,
individual behavior might change, but the formal pattern of
interaction would remain constant.
The systemic model provided a liberating departure from
the focus on content represented by psychodynamic theories.
Instead of exploring the schizophrenic's delusions as the
symbolic expression of myriad historical events, psychosis
could be understood as a homeostatic response to threatened
changes in the family system, for example, the identified
patient's moves to leave home. By implication, if not
always by explicit declaration, the systemic form was
understood as the cause of behavior.
It was within the systemic model's emphasis on formal
causality that paradox attracted such interest. This is
because logical paradox is a form which generates vicious-
circle meaning reversals. The application of the formal
attributes of logical paradox to interaction was consistent
with the emphasis on formal causality in systems thinking.
The formal features of the paradox were considered a
determining influence in interaction. Time and again in the
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literature, the Epi.enides paradox was summoned to account
for presumably inescapable forces in human transactions: in
the no-win situation of the communication of families of
schizophrenics, in the power of hypnotic suggestion and
symptom prescription, and in the more ordinary apparent
frustrations of so-called "Be spontaneous" requests.
As a formal force in communication, logical paradox was
used to explain a broad variety of interactional phenomena.
In their excitement with this radically new type of
explanation, theorists overlooked both the actual form of
the communication labeled paradoxical and the readily
observable instances of nonproblemat ic negotiations of these
forms. The almost mystical power of paradox was preferred
to more complex analysis which would necessitate moving away
from formal cause to a consideration of the negotiation of
meaning and action by conscious, striving human beings.
In this dissertation, the paradoxical communication
literature was critically reviewed with the result that
three distinct communication forms described as paradoxical
in the literature were identified. Contradictory double-
level communication may be defined as the occurrence of
contradictory messages delivered at distinct levels of
abstraction and should not be considered paradoxical.
Further analysis of this form revealed three different types
of contradictory double-level communication depending on the
hierarchical relationship of the contradictory messages:
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the paradoxes of abstraction in which the relationship is
stable and the higher level message contextual^ the lower
level message; the strange loop in which a balance exists
between levels with each being equally likely to be the
context for the other; and the double bind in which the
enforcement of shifts in the hierarchical relationship of
the messages functions to prevent a successful
interpretation of the communication.
The second form of communication inappropriately
identified as paradoxical in the literature is the request
for involuntary behavior. Such requests include hypnotic
injunctions, therapeutic symptom prescriptions and requests
for emotional responses in ordinary relationships. This
form of request was conceptualized as formally impossible
since a person cannot voluntarily comply with such a request
by producing involuntary behavior on purpose.
The request for noncompliant behavior represents a
third form of communication described appropriately as
paradoxical in the literature. Injunctions for
noncompliance in the form of independence and dominance are
Eormally parallel to the "Disobey me" paradox: if the
respondent complies with the request, s/he must be
noncompliant and if the person is noncompliant, then s/he
has complied with the request. Truly paradoxical meaning
reversals obtain in this communication form.
This brief review of the communication forms described
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as paradoxical in the literature again demonstrates the rich
diversity of phenomena to which the concept has been
applied. Given the problems with this application, the
question now arises as to how paradox ought to be utilized
in theoretical efforts to understand human communication.
It is the recommendation of this writer that the term,
paradox, be retained for theoretical discussion only in its
ordinary definition and not in its philosophical definition
as a self-reflexive negative statement. in the cases of
contradictory double-level communication and the request for
involuntary behavior, the usefulness of removing the logical
definition of paradox from the literature is apparent as
both these forms have been inappropriately described as
par adox ical
.
However, even in the case of the request for
noncompliant behavior, no useful purpose is served by
continuing a reference to logical paradox. This is because
despite the formal parallel between logical paradox and the
request for noncompliant behavior, the actual relevance of
this connection has never been established. First, the
vicious-circle meaning reversals which occur in logical
paradox cannot occur in the actual world of human
interaction. The injunction, "Disobey me," when considered
in the abstract poses an impossible request. If it is
obeyed, it is disobeyed and if it is disobeyed, it is
obeyed. One apparent response implies the reverse and so on
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me
in a never-ending circle. If, however, I said, "Disobey
by crossing this line in the sand," what could happen? if
you crossed the line, I could say, "Ah ha- You've obeyed me
and I said, 'Disobey if, on the other hand, you stood
your ground, I could say, "Ah ha! You've obeyed me by
disobeying me!" But neither response would imply the
reverse in the fashion of a vicious-circle.
A second reason for abandoning the use of logical
paradox to describe noncompliant behavior requests is that
the problematic nature of responding to such requests in
reality only occurs in terms of the disqualification of
compliant efforts. If a woman tells her husband to be more
independent, she may interpret his efforts to comply with
her request as more dependent behavior, but it is simply a
fantastic imposition of the paradox to suggest that she
would interpret his failure to behave mote independently as
evidence of his being more independent.
Instead of conceptualizing the request for noncompliant
behavior as paradoxical in a logical sense—although this
formal parallel can be drawn--it makes more sense to
describe it in terms of the ordinary sense of paradox, an
apparent contradiction. This would tie together involuntary
behavior requests and noncompliant behavior requests with
respect to their common feature that a compliant response to
such a request may be disqualified. The abandonment of
logical paradox as a useful model of communication would
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open up the field t0 the challenge of discovering how
-voluntary behavior requests and nonco™pliant behavior
-guests are negotiated in ordinary interaction and what is
their significance. The oualH-aH„0m q itative analysis presented in
Chapter V represents one approach to this problem.
The empirical study presented in this dissertation
makes two major contributions to the field. Heretofore,
involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior'
requests have been considered rare and necessarily
dysfunctional injunctions in the context of ordinary close
relationships. The study contradicts both assumptions by
showing that examples of such requests are easily identified
by subjects and that in most cases, at least one satisfying
response occurs following such a request. These findings
should reduce the mystification which has attended study of
these kinds of requests and open the way to exploration of
both their adaptive and maladaptive functions in
relationships
.
One particular clinical implication of the finding that
involuntary behavior requests and noncompliant behavior
requests are not necessarily associated with unsatisfying
relational interactions is that a therapist who hears of
such a request must not assume that this is pathological.
For example, a parent may describe to a therapist an
interaction in which the request was made for more
independence from the child. In this case, the therapist
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must not conclude that a dysfunctional paradoxical request
has been made, but should rather explore how this request
was negotiated. The possibility exists that a successful
effort to comply with the request was made by the child and
that the parent was satisfied with this response.
A second clinical implication of the present research
involves the question of how the therapeutic technique of
symptom prescription works. in Chapter II, the point was
made that current writers on therapeutic paradox have turned
away from a consideration of logical paradox in their
discussions of this technique. At the same time, however,
the idea that therapeutic paradox is intrinsically powerful
has remained .popular in the field. This dissertation
supports the move away from a focus on logical paradox in
understanding therapeutic paradox, but it also demonstrates
the importance of relational negotiation of these requests.
With regard to therapeutic paradox, this indicates the need
to avoid assuming an intrinsic power in the form of the
technique and to instead explore the meaning of this
injunction as it is negotiated between the therapist and the
client or family.
The major limitation of the present study is the use of
individual self-report data. This is because the
negotiation of involuntary behavior requests and
noncompliant behavior requests is necessarily a two-way
interaction. One possibility in interactions surrounding
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these requests which received attention in this study is
that the person who delivers the injunction may disqualify
any attempt at compliance. Another possibility which was
not investigated here is that the recipient of the request
might feel confused and frustrated by the request itself and
by the problem of how to comply successfully with the
request. A promising research approach for the future would
involve the use of interviews with couples about how
involuntary behavior requests are negotiated. The present
study establishes the fact that individual subjects can
identify and describe these request types so it would be
possible to arrange for couples to provide similar kinds of
reports
.
Perhaps one of the most interesting implications of the
present study for future research is that it highlights the
social construction of both involuntary and independent
behavior. In exploring how requests for these types of
behavior are negotiated in close relationships, this
dissertation provides a starting point for the study of how
these highly significant varieties of human experience are
created in social interaction.
FOOTNOTES
X The actual paradox of Epimenides the Cretan takes the
form,
-All Cretans are liars." As Quine (1962) has noted,
this statement raises some nonparadox ica 1 possibilities
because liars do not always lie. So Epimenides might have
been a liar who was telling the truth when he said, "All
Cretans are liars."
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
I. Demographic Information
A. How old are you?
B. What year are you in school?
C To whom did you address this request?
D. How old is 0?
E
- 0 is: Male Female
F. What is o-s year in school or occupation?
II. Relationship History
A. What was the nature of your relationship with 0at the time you made or were making the request?
B.
C.
When did your relationship with 0 begin?
What changes, if any, have occurred in your
relationship with 0?
III. Request History
A. How many times did you make the request?
B. (Request number = 1) when did you make th<=
request?
C (Request number > 1) when did you first makp the
request?
D. When did you last make the request?
IV. Response History
A. How many times did 0 (insert nature of requested
response in passive form)?
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B.
C.
D.
E.
H.
J.
ie
e
8
8
p
P
o
0
„a
8
e
e
7
= l) WhSn did
°
sh
-
this
S°ns
S
e
e
? >
1] WhSn did 0 «** show this
When did 0 last show this response?
Of the responses described above, which do youthink occurred because of your request?
In addition to the responses described above, did0 make any specific efforts to fulfill your request?
did 0
an
/ake^
eCifiC effOCtS t0 fUlfUl y° Ur re^est
(Specific efforts = 1) when did 0 make the
specific effort to fulfill your request?
(Specific efforts > 1) when did 0 first make aspecific effort to fulfill your request?
When did 0 last make a specific effort to fulfillyour request?
V. Request Episode Description
A. Recall the time when you made the request that is
most clear for you. If you cannot recall a
specific time when you made the request, think
about a typical interaction in which you made the
request
.
B. Where were you when you made the request?
C. What was going on between you and 0 when you made
the request?
D What exactly happened when you made the request?
What led up to the request? What happened after
the request? What did each of you say and do?
How did you understand what was happening in this
episode?
How did 0 understand what was happening in this
episode?
Now I'd like to go back to the specifics of your
interaction with 0. I'd like you to give me a
194
descriptive name for each act- in • „
t^ nglatboeldoSh°r P^n^s
Request Episode Ratings
A. How positive or negative was your subjectiveemotional experience in this episode up to andincluding your request?
Very Negative „ . ,Very Positive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B. Please explain your rating.
C At the end of this episode, how positive or
negative was your subjective, emotional state?
Very Negative
: Very Positive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
D. Please explain your rating.
E. At the end of this episode, how positively or
negatively did you feel about the long-term
consequences of this episode for your
relationship with 0?
Very Negative Very Positivel2 3456789
F. Please explain your rating.
G. How clearly did you and 0 understand each other
in this episode?
We understood each We understood each
other very well other very poorly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
H. Please explain your rating.
I. Who had more control over what happened in this
epi sode?
195
1 had more control
— control
1 ^ ° ther PerS ° n had ™ore
The other person had more control
J. Please explain your rating.
VII. Reflexive Needs
A. What response to your request did you desire from
B. How would the desired response have affected yourthoughts and feelings about yourself?
C How much did you need this desired response toyour request in order to achieve these thoughts
and feelings about yourself?
1 nee(
?
e? I needed itVer y llttle very much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
D. Please explain your rating.
E. How would the desired response to your request
have affected your relationship with 0?
F. How much did you need the desired response to
your request in order to achieve this meaning of
your relationship with 0?
I needed it I needed it
very little very much123456789
G. Please explain your rating.
H. At the time of this episode, what changes, if
any, did you desire in your relationship with 0?
VIII. Response Episode Description
A. Now, think of O's response following your
request. (If only one response occurred, go to
D.)
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the request"^ wa^os^^^^
the response following the request La? ITsatisfying to you. Think now^of "the ?east
^
sat^sfy.ng response following the request! (Go
C (More than one response.) if you cannot recallspecific responses following the request thin!about a typical interaction involving a responsefollowing your request which was most ato you and a typical interaction involving aresponse following the request which was Lastsatisfying to you. Think now of the leastsatisfying typical interaction.
D. Where were you when the response following therequest occurred? y
E. What was going on between you and 0 when the
response following the request occurred?
F. What happened exactly when the response followingthe request occurred? What led up to the
response? What happened after the response
occurred? What did each of you say and do?
G. How did you understand what was happening in this
episode?
H. How did 0 understand what was happening in this
epi sode?
I. Now I'd like to go back to the specifics of yourinteraction with 0. I'd like you to give me adescriptive name for each act in the episode.
This label should describe what each person was
trying to do. Examples of such labels include:
insult, plea for help, information seeking.
Let's begin with (first act of response episode).
What name would you give this act?
Response Episode Ratings
A. How positive or negative was your subjective,
emotional experience in this episode?
Very Negative Very Positive123456789
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B. Please explain your rating.
C At the end of this episode, how oositivelvornegatively did you feel about the lono-termconsequences of this episode for your"relationship with 0?
Very Negative
Very Positive
1 2 3
^ 5 6 7 8 9
D. Please explain your rating.
E. How clearly did you and 0 understand each otho rin this episode? HBI
We understood each m *
other very well
We understood each
1 other very poorly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
F. Please explain your rating.
Who had more control over what happened in this
episode?
I had more control
G
Neither I nor the other person had more
control
Tne other person had more control
Please explain your rating.
Reflexive Effects
A. How did the response following your request
affect your thoughts and feelings about yourself?
B. How did the response following your request
affect your relationship with 0?
Satisfaction and Compliance Ratings
A. How satisfied did you feel with the other
person's response in this episode?
198
Completely
satisfied Completely
dissatisfied
1 2 3 4 5 c3 6 7 8 9
B. Please explain your rating.
c
- TsLT^r, srsi tiro n
he
H0
or r di ? b— 1
a 9 ree or dt.^S. Sltt this "t^n"9^ *° ^
Strongly agree c . , M .btrongly disagree
1 2 3 4 s e41 5 6 7 8 9
Please explain your rating.
rte or she
. . . (insert involuntary or
S?ronalv 52*
° f rec
*
uested response). Howst g y do you agree or disagree with thisstatement?
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
F. Please explain your rating.
D
E
Second Response Episode
A. Think now of the most satisfying response
following the request. If you cannot recall aparticular response which was most satisfying,
think about a typical interaction involving a
response following your request which was most
satisfying to you.
B. Repeat administration of items VIII. D. throuqh
X I . F . *

